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Case Note
SECURITIES-STATE REGULATION-TENDER
OFFER-VALIDITY AND CONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF STATE TAKEOVER
STATUTES*
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D.
Tex. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2809
(5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977).
On September 2, 1977, in Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell,' the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas invalidated the Idaho Takeover Act2 under both the
supremacy clause' and the commerce clause4 of the United States
Constitution. The Act violated the supremacy clause by placing a
burden upon tender offers' contrary to the purposes of existing
* AUTHOR'S NOTE: Recently, in a two-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's invalidation of the Idaho Takeover Act. Great
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 1978). The appellate court
adopted the lower court's reasoning that the takeover statute was preempted by the Wil-
liams Act because it conflicted with the Act's objectives. The court also held that the
Idaho statute was invalid under the commerce clause. While departing from the district
court's view that the takeover statute effected no legitimate local interests, the appellate
court found that what local interests the statute did serve were outweighed by the burdens
imposed on interstate commerce. One member of the court dissented on jurisdictional
grounds but accepted the majority's preemption and commerce clause analysis.
1. 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appealdocketed, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept. 16,
1977).
2. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501 to 1513 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
3. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. Although not expressly defined either in federal or state laws and regulations, a
"tender offer" is conventionally defined as a
publicly made invitation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender
their shares for sale at a specified price. Cash or other securities may be offered
to the shareholders as consideration; in either case, the consideration specified
usually represents a premium over the current market price of the securities
sought.
Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 86 HARV. L. REv.1250, 1251 (1973); see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d
579, 596-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974); E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 69-76 (1973). As noted above, "tender offer"
applies to both a cash offer and an exchange offer whereby the offeror offers securities in
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federal regulation; it also violated the need implicit in the com-
merce clause for flexible interstate traffic in securities.
Despite the continuing controversy over the validity of state
takeover statutes, Great Western presented a case of first impres-
sion.6 The dispute originated with an announcement by Great
Western United Corporation (GWU) on March 21, 1977 that it
would make a cash tender offer for two million shares of Sunshine
Mining Company (Sunshine) common stock.' Sunshine is a
Washington corporation, having its principal place of business
and substantial assets in Idaho. GWU, which already controlled
six per cent of Sunshine stock, offered to purchase the additional
amount for $15.75 per share,8 a price exceeding that available on
the exchange at the time. GWU had previously made a "friendly
offer"9 to Sunshine management of $16.75 per share. Concur-
rently with the announced offer, GWU filed both a Schedule 13D
statement 10 with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursu-
ant to the Williams Act" and a registration statement with the
"exchange" for the desired shares. For the purposes of this Note discussion will center on
cash offers since exchange offers played no part in the Great Western litigation. See 439 F.
Supp. at 424.
6. It ih primarily the nature of the tender offer-requiring speed to be effective-which
has precluded a time-consuming court challenge until now. Subcommittee on Proxy Solic-
itations and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Securities Commission of the
A.B.A. Section of Corporate, Banking, and Business Law, State Takeover Statutes and the
WiliamsAct, 32 Bus. LAW. 187, 192 (1976). In at least one instance, however, a court had
opportunity to pass on some of the issues presented in Great Western and sidestepped
them. See Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 606-07 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (court
failed to discuss the issue of conflict with state law).
7. This represented approximately 35% of the outstanding Sunshine common voting
stock. 439 F. Supp. at 424.
8. Sunshine stock opened at 15 and closed at 14 Y8 on March 21, 1977 on the New York
Stock Exchange. Thus the premium offered amounted to between $.75 and $.875 per
share. Id.
9. A "friendly" tender offer is one that is approved by the subject company's board of
directors or solicited by the board to ward off a hostile tender offer. See E. ARANOW & H.
EINHORN, supra note 5, at 242-44.
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-I (1977). Since commencement of the Great Western suit,
offeror registration and disclosure has been brought under § 240.14d-1 and accompanying
sections. See notes 152-54 infra and accompanying text.
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 1(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976), as amended by Domestic and
Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 202, 91 Stat.
1498. In a related action, Sunshine brought suit against GWU asserting inadequate disclo-
sure under the 1934 Act. Sunshine Mining Co. v. Great W. United Corp., No. 77-1064 (D.
Idaho 1977). The court in that suit determined that there were no omissions in GWU's
SEC filing under the federal act. This litigation was dismissed following a settlement
agreement between the parties on October 5, 1977. Settlement, however, does not appear
to render moot the principal case discussed herein. See Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Great
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Idaho Director of Finance pursuant to the Idaho Takeover Act. 2
GWU also contacted representatives of the States of Maryland
and New York regarding the possible assertion of jurisdiction
over the proposed tender offer by virtue of their takeover laws.' 3
On March 25, 1977, GWU received notice from the Idaho De-
partment of Finance that the disclosures made in the registration
statement were inadequate and that the statutory twenty day wait-
ing period for a hearing would not start until disclosure satisfac-
tory to the director was made.14  Upon receipt of the directive,
GWU promptly filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Northern District of Texas against officers of the state agencies of
Idaho, Maryland, and New York. 5 The complaint sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief, charging that the takeover statutes
of the three states constituted an "unconstitutional burden on in-
terstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. . . [and]
intrude[d] unwarrantedly into an area preempted by federal regu-
lation in contravention of the Supremacy Clause."' 6
W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appeal docketed, No.
77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977).
12. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
13. For Maryland's and New York's takeover provisions, see MD. CORP. & ASs'NS.
CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to 908 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1613
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977). Maryland and New York, although joined as defendants
in the complaint, did not remain parties to the litigation. Maryland was dismissed on the
grounds that there existed no article III "case or controversy," because the state's adminis-
trators did not assert jurisdiction over GWU's offer. 439 F. Supp. at 424-25, 428. The
court dismissed the complaint against New York as moot following a determination by that
state that GWU would not be making a tender offer as defined in the New York statute
and, as such, the tender offer would not be subject to New York's registration require-
ments. Id. at 425, 427-29.
14. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(5) (Curi. Supp. 1975).
15. Whether the Texas court could have subject matter and personal jurisdiction over
the case and the parties constituted a major issue at trial. The court held initially that
GWU, a Texas based corporation, properly brought suit in that state. It found subject
matter jurisdiction under § 27 of the 1934 Act, permitting jurisdiction of district courts over
suits for declaratory judgments, and under the doctrines of federal question, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1976), diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), and acts regulating commerce, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337 (1976), 439 F. Supp. at 429-30. The court further found, in considering its in
personam jurisdiction, that there was nothing "unfair" about forcing the Idaho defendants
to litigate where the actions had "predictable consequences." 439 F. Supp. at 430-33. The
jurisdictional issues involved in this case constitute a complex and separate problem in
challenges to state takeover statutes; this Note, however, will discuss only the merits of the
constitutional claims.
16. Complaint at 2, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex.
1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977).
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The court granted a temporary restraining order on the basis
of the complaint and arguments, summarizing what later would
become the court's conclusion, that
immediate and irreparable injury ... will result to Applicant
unless Defendants are forthwith restrained as prayed for in the
Complaint in that Applicant will be deprived of its federally
protected right to make-its proposed cash tender offer, will be
subjected to conflicting laws, will be subjected to delay with
[sic] disrupts the orderly trading of its securities and those of
the target company on national securities markets, and may be
denied the advantages of a uniform national system of regula-
tion in making its interstate cash tender offer ....
Approximately six months later, Judge Robert M. Hill ruled that
the Idaho Takeover Act was unconstitutional. His decision was
based on both grounds of unconstitutionality alleged in GWU's
complaint. First, he found the Idaho Act preempted by federal
regulation of tender offers under the Williams Act and therefore
violative of the supremacy clause. Judge Hill applied three basic
tests for preemption:
First, a state statute is preempted if it is apparent from fed-
eral statutes, their legislative histories, or the pervasiveness of
the federal regulatory scheme that Congress intended to occupy
the field and displace state regulations. Second, a state statute
is preempted if it affects a field in which the federal interest is
so dominant as to preclude state laws regulating the same sub-
ject. Finally, a state statute is preempted if it conflicts with the
federal law to such an extent as to be an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the federal scheme.' 8
The first two arguments for preemption were summarily dis-
missed. As to the pervasiveness of the federal scheme, the court
discounted any intent to occupy the field based upon what it
found to be an "impassable obstacle" created by forty years of
coexisting state and federal securities regulation. 9 Applying its
second test, the court denied any dominance of the federal inter-
17. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, No. 3-77-045-D (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1977)
(order granting temporary restraining order).
"Subject company" and "target company" are interchangeable concepts. Recently, the
SEC in proposed rule 14d-1 changed the terminology from "target" to the more neutral
"subject" to refer to the issuer whose stock is being sought pursuant to a tender offer. SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 34-12, 676 (Aug. 2, 1976), reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 24,281 A. at 17,715-7B. In keeping with the SEC's
proposed change, all references other than those in quotation will be to the more recent
"subject company". See Note, The Creditor as a Particpant in a Tender Offer Under the
WilliamsAct, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 910, 910 n.3 (1978).
18. 439 F. Supp. at 435.
19. "Such coexistence would be impossible if Congress has occupied the field." Id.
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est.2" Using language very similar to that normally found in a
pervasiveness argument, the court said, "Federal control of the se-
curities field is not so 'intensive and exclusive' as is federal control
over aviation. States have a valid interest in regulation of securi-
ties sold within their borders and state statutes have existed regu-
lating this area for some time."2
The third test, conflict between the federal and state regula-
tions, became the focus of the court's finding of preemption. The
court quickly discredited the defendants' major defense to the pre-
emption argument-that preemption based upon conflict requires
an impossibility of compliance with both the federal and state
provisions.22 Instead, the court undertook to examine and con-
strue both the Williams Act and the Idaho Act to determine
whether a conflict existed in the purposes of the two laws. It
found that the purpose of the Williams Act is to strike a balance
between the offeror and subject management; that is, to achieve
shareholder protection without unduly impeding cash takeover
bids, which Congress found beneficial. By examining the Act's
legislative history, the court concluded that Congress, in an effort
to maintain this balance, favored minimal disclosure and rejected
preoffer disclosure requirements. 23
On the other hand, the court found that the Idaho Takeover
Act seeks to regulate the making of tender offers "primarily for
the benefit of the management of the target company."24 First,
the Act requires the offeror to provide more detailed information
which the court concluded was "only collaterally related" to infor-
mation necessary for a shareholder's decision.25 Second, it delays
a potential takeover by requiring prior approval by the Idaho Di-
rector of Finance and by permitting subject management to call a
hearing in order to "marshal its resources." 26 Finally, the Act
provides for disclosure by the offeror without similarly obligating
the subject company.27 The court held that these provisions upset
the careful balance struck by the Williams Act and concluded,
therefore, that the Idaho Act was preempted by federal regulation.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 437.
23. Id. at 436.
24. Id. at 437.
25. Id. at 436.
26. Id.
27. Id.
1978]
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As an alternative basis for its finding that the Idaho statute
was unconstitutional, the court ruled that it violated the commerce
clause by creating an excessive burden on interstate commerce
without serving a legitimate local interest. Citing the general test
found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,28 Judge Hill summarized the
commerce clause analysis as follows:
In order to be valid, a state statute regulating commerce must,
first, effectuate a legitimate local public interest; second, affect
interstate commerce only incidentally and; third, if the first two
criteria are met, meet a balancing test applied to determine
whether or not the burden imposed on commerce is excessive in
relationship to the alleged local benefits provided by the stat-
ute.
29
In determining that the Act serves no legitimate local interest,
the court stated that the typical justification for state takeover laws
is the "protection of shareholders of corporations which are incor-
porated in or have significant connections with the controlling
state."3 Although the state may articulate this purpose in the
legislative history or in the Act itself, the true purpose or "local
interest" to be protected must be determined by viewing the
"practical effects" of the statute. The court concluded that "the
immediate purpose of the statute is to protect incumbent manage-
ment."" As evidence of "practical effects" demonstrating that,
with respect to the Idaho statute, the local interest was not really
the protection of shareholders, the court relied upon (1) delay pro-
cedures which frustrate tender offers, (2) dissuasion of offerors
from making a tender offer to avoid the burden of one or more
state takeover statutes, (3) discouragement of offerors from mak-
ing the highest possible offer to the shareholders in an attempt to
convince subject company management to approve the offer, and
(4) the possibility that subject company management resistance
might cause a reduction in the original offer made to sharehold-
ers.
3 2
After repudiating the legitimacy of the Act's articulated pur-
pose, the court briefly discussed and ultimately rejected the state
interest in preventing the removal of businesses from the state:
"[A] statute [which regulates interstate commerce] may not be en-
28. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443 (1960)).
29. 439 F. Supp. at 438.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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acted 'solely for protection of local economic interests.' 33
In applying the Pike requirement that the state act pursuant to
a legitimate local interest, the court criticized the extraterritorial
impact of the Idaho Act. Referring particularly to section
30-1506(1) of the Act,34 Judge Hill determined that "[t]he Idaho
statute . . . undertakes to regulate the offeror's affairs not only
within Idaho, but within all states in which the offeror might
make a tender offer."35 Furthermore, the court held that "[t]his
intended extraterritorial effect distinguishes the takeover statute
from state Blue Sky laws, which clearly do not intend to govern
regulation of securities outside state boundaries. 36
Applying the second criterion of Pike-that a state statute
must affect interstate commerce only incidentally-the court
found that the Idaho Act had a substantial detrimental effect upon
interstate commerce because it "purposefully precludes Great
Western's making a tender offer anywhere until the provisions of
the Idaho statute are met."37
Because the burden on interstate commerce was direct and
substantial, the balancing of federal and state interests was unnec-
essary. However, assuming arguendo that the third prong of the
Pike test should be dealt with, Judge Hill continued the analysis,
identifying five significant burdens on interstate commerce.38
First, "takeover statutes have a tendency to discourage offerors
from making tender offers and . . . the very presence of state
takeover statutes might eliminate the possibility of a tender offer
being made."39  Second, the problem of potential multiple and
conflicting statutes "unquestionably" burdens interstate com-
merce.40 Third, the court referred to "evidence. . . that the take-
over statutes encourage offerors to make lower offers than would
have been made without the statute."4  Fourth, the Idaho Act
would disrupt the national market for Sunshine stock as a result of
33. Id. (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531 (1940)). The lan-
guage used by Judge Hill erroneously quoted from the Hood decision, which stated "by
protection" rather than "for protection" Compare 439 F. Supp. at 438 with 336 U.S. at
531.
34. See text accompanying notes 81 and 255-57 infra.
35. 439 F. Supp. at 439.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 37.
41. Id.
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preoffer disclosure and hearing provisions.42 Finally, the Act
would hinder and perhaps eliminate the tender offer by permit-
ting subject management an extensive period in which to thwart
the offer through various defense mechanisms. 3 Together, these
views of the Act moved the court to find that the burden imposed
upon interstate commerce was not justified by the state's proffered
interest.
Great Western-s analysis of the validity of Idaho's takeover
law raises significant issues in the present scheme of two-tiered
tender offer regulation in over one-half of the states. This Note
analyzes the court's treatment of the preemption and commerce
clause issues. It then evaluates the Idaho Takeover Act and con-
cludes by suggesting the narrowest range of possible changes
needed to bring it into harmony with the objectives of the Wil-
liams Act and the commerce clause.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. The Williams Act
Federal regulation of cash tender offers began in the late
1960's in response to an overwhelming increase in their use as a
means of acquiring control of corporations.' Among the advan-
tages of the tender offer over other means was the secrecy and
speed available to the offeror.45 The advantages to the offeror,
however, were frought with danger for the shareholders of the
subject company. Prior to the Williams Act, a cash tender offer
could be made without any required disclosure upon which share-
holders could base their decision to tender shares. In contrast,
other forms of corporate acquisition have long been subject to fed-
eral regulation designed to provide adequate disclosure to share-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Indeed, the amount of subject company assets involved in tender offers increased
five-fold during the early 1960's. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 64.
45. Other reasons to which the increased use of tender offers can be attributed are (I)
greater corporate liquidity and available credit, (2) greater attraction for tender offers as a
takeover technique because of depressed price/earnings ratio, book values, and cash or
quick assets ratios, (3) faster results at less cost and with more flexibility than proxy con-
tests, (4) the psychological appeal to shareholders more willing to deal in concrete dollar
terms, and (5) lack of pervasive federal and state control. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
supra note 5, at 64-66; Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock,
22 Bus. LAW. 149, 149 (1966); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 377, 386 (1969);
Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Reulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L.
Rav. 1133, 1138-39 (1974).
[Vol. 28:955
]STATE TAKEOVER LAWS
holders. For instance, an exchange offer, whereby the acquiring
party offers securities in "exchange" for the desired shares, re-
quires registration under the Securities Act of 193346 and applica-
ble Blue Sky laws.4 7 In these cases the shareholder would receive
a prospectus containing material facts about the offer and of-
feror.48 A proxy contest is subject to the Securities Exchange Act
of 193449 and involves substantial disclosure of information re-
garding the offer and offeror." The cash tender offer could not be
made to fit within the framework of existing regulation, either on
the federal or the state level, and it was thereby effectively exempt
from disclosure provisions, leaving a massive gap in the federal
scheme of shareholder protection.-"
In an effort to close the gap, Congress passed the Williams
Act52 which amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "to
provide investors with full disclosure and other substantive pro-
tections within a statutory framework favoring neither the tender
offeror nor the management of the target company."'53 The over-
all purpose was to protect investors without jeopardizing the via-
bility of tender offers. Congress recognized the usefulness of
tender offers as a means of checking entrenched, inefficient man-
agement54 and thus framed the Williams Act to provide sufficient
disclosure without interjecting undue delay into the procedure.
The Williams Act imposed extensive disclosure requirements
on anyone making an offer for a class of securities registered
under section 12 of the 1934 Act if the offeror would be the bene-
ficial owner of five per cent of that class.5 In accordance with
section 14(d)(1), the offeror must file with the Securities and Ex-
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 77e (1976).
47. See generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 61-62 (2d ed. 1961).
48. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77h, 77j (1976).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj, 78n (1976).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1978).
51. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813. See generally GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
52. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-78(e),
78n(d)-78(f) (1976)).
53. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 5, at 67 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813-14).
54. H.R. REP. No. 1711,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811, 2813.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970). The original provision required disclosure if the
offeror would become beneficial owner of 10% of the class of securities. Pub. L. No.
90-439, 82 Stat. 454 & 2. The new provision was superseded by the 1970 amendments to
the Williams Act. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 3, 84 Stat. 1497.
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change Commission information specifically required by section
13(d)(1), 56 plus any other information that the Commission may
deem relevant to protect the investor.5 1 Subject company man-
agement must also comply with the informational provisions of
the Williams Act. It must file a Schedule 14D statement with the
SEC when making a recommendation to shareholders concerning
the offer. 8 The purpose of this disclosure is also to protect the
shareholder by providing the greatest amount of information
available from all sources. 9 Should disclosure be incomplete or
the statute otherwise not complied with, the tender offeror may be
subjected to a variety of sanctions. Either the SEC or the subject
56. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. 1972-77) requires the following information:
(A) the background, and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the na-
ture of such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons by whom
or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be
used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price or proposed
purchase price is represented or is to be represented by funds or other considera-
tion borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
trading such security, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties
thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan made in the ordinary course
of business by a bank, as defined in section 78c(a)(6) of this title, if the person
filing such statement so requests, the name of the bank shall not be made avail-
able to the public;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which
such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it with
any other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or corporate
structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and
the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or
indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving the
name and address of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements, puts
or calls, guaranties of loans, guaranties against loss of guaranties of profits, divi-
sion of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the per-
sons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been
entered into, and giving the details thereof.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
58. Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1977). The SEC has also proposed regula-
tions for issuer tender offers. Proposed Rule 13e-4 and Schedule 13E-4, SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 14,234, 42 Fed. Reg. 63066 (1977).
59. In addition to disclosure, the Williams Act encompasses other protective provi-
sions. Section 14(d)(5) permits shareholders who have tendered shares to withdraw them
during the first seven days or after 60 days from the date the offer was made public. 15
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1976). Section 14(d)(6) provides for a pro rata takeup of all shares
tendered during the first 10 days where the offer was made for less than all shares out-
standing. Id. § 78n(d)(6). And, § 14(d)(7) requires that any increase in the purchase price
over the course of the offer be paid to those shareholders who had previously tendered
their shares. Id. § 78n(d)(7); Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon Tender Offers, 47 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1140-46 (1974).
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company may seek an injunction to prevent the offeror from mak-
ing further purchases until compliance with the statute has been
completed.6" In addition, shareholders may have a private action
for rescission6' or for damages62 resulting from fraudulent or de-
ceptive practices.
Recently, the number of state takeover statutes has grown in
response to the increased use of tender offers.63 At last count
thirty-three such statutes existed.' The effect is a two-tiered sys-
tem of regulation-the state acts superimposed upon the Williams
Act. Generally, state regulation is benign, falling within the
boundaries of the 1933 and 1934 Acts.65 Some states, however,
have gone further and have adopted procedures and requirements
in excess of those found in federal regulations.66 The takeover
statute of one of those states, Idaho, has become the focus of the
Great Western litigation.
B. The Idaho Takeover Act
In 1975 the Idaho legislature considered and adopted the
Idaho Takeover Act67 to regulate the making of tender offers for
corporate control. As defined, the Act triggers the state's jurisdic-
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(l) (1976). See also Bath Indus. Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 111
(7th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Madison Square Garden Corp. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1192,649 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); North Am. Car Corp. v. Flying Tiger Corp.
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,757 (N.D. Ill. 1970). It should
be noted that § 14(e) of the 1934 Act may also provide shareholders with injunctive reme-
dies against subject company management. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G. BERL-
STEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 114, 129-34 (1977).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). See generally Newman v. Elec. Specialty Co. [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 92,591 (N.D. IIl. 1969).
63. The first state takeover statute was enacted in Virginia. Virginia Take-Over-Bid
Disclosure Act of 1968, VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to .1-540 (1973). The Virginia Act, effec-
tive March 5, 1968, actually predates the Williams Act. By far the majority of state stat-
utes, however, have been written within the past two years. See Appleton, The Proposed
SEC Tender Offer Rules-The Proposed Requirements, 32 Bus. LAW. 1381 (1977).
64. Bartell, State Take-Over Laws: A Survey, in COURSE HANDBOOK FOR PRACTICING
LAW INSTITUTE, NINTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION (1977).
65. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 153
(1973).
66. See, eg., Maryland Corporate Take-Over Law (1976), MD. CORP. & ASS'NS. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Security Takeover Disclosure Act (1976), N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1600-1613 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
78.376-.378 (1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1977).
67. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Idaho had never before
concerned itself with tender offers; the passage of the 1975 Act was in response to intense
lobbying by Morrison-Knudson Corporation which was apparently in imminent danger of
being taken over itself. The bill eventually enacted was largely the work of Morrison-
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tion over a tender offer whenever the subject company is (1) incor-
porated in Idaho or (2) has its principal office and substantial
assets in the state.6" The offer is termed a "takeover offer" only if
it would succeed in making the offeror the beneficial owner of five
per cent or more of the subject company's outstanding securities.6 9
Despite the Great Western court's finding as to the Act's pur-
pose,7° the tone expressed in the words of the statute is the same as
that of the Williams Act-investor protection.7'
According to the Idaho Act, an offeror may not lawfully make
an offer for any shares of a subject company without first filing a
registration statement with the director of finance.72 Prior to or
simultaneous with this filing, the offeror must file a copy of that
statement with the subject company and publicly disclose the
terms of the offer.73 In the registration statement the offeror must
include (1) ownership information, 74 (2) three copies of the pro-
posed tender offer, and (3) material information75 concerning the
organization and operations of any corporate or noncorporate of-
feror.76  Regardless of the efforts made at complete disclosure, an
offer cannot become effective without the approval of the director,
who may, at his discretion, order a hearing if he determines that
the registration statement is insufficient.77 The hearing, which
Knudson's chief counsel. See The Delaying Game. Firms Shall Takeover Via Obscure New
Laws, Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 26, col. 2.
68. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
69. Id. § 30-1501(5).
70. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
71. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
72. Id. § 30-1503(1).
73. Id.
74. IDAHO CODE § 30-1502(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Paragraph (2) of this section gives
offerors the option of filing the § 13(d) information required under the 1934 Act.
75. See text accompanying note 150 infra.
76. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(2)(c), -1503(2)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
77. Id. § 30-1503(3). Although the scope of discretion vested in the director of finance
appears broad, it remains limited by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, IDAHO CODE
§§ 67-5201 to -5216 (1973), which provides for judicial reversal of an administrative deci-
sion which proves:
(1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record, or
(6) arbitrary and capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
Id. § 67-5215(g). Access to remedies under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act has
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can also be requested by the subject company,78 delays the effec-
tive date of the tender offer for a month or more. According to
section 30-1503(5), it must be held within twenty days of filing the
registration statement, and a determination on the merits of the
offer must come within ten days thereafter.79  The offer may be
postponed indefinitely, however, "for the convenience of the par-
ties or for the protection of the offerees of this state."80
In addition to requiring disclosure, the Idaho Act restricts the
nature of the offer itself. Section 30-1506(1) provides that "[n]o
offeror may make a takeover offer involving a target company
which is not made to all its stockholders in this state, or which is
not made to stockholders in this state on substantially the same
terms as the offer is made to stockholders outside this state." This
type of provision is most often construed as conferring extraterri-
torial power upon the state director of finance by preventing the
offeror from bypassing the state and obtaining the necessary
shares from other areas not possessing such restrictions.81 As
construed, the provision raises serious constitutional questions
concerning the ability of a state to regulate commerce beyond its
borders.
Four major exceptions limit the otherwise expansive scope of
the Idaho Act.82 First, ten subject company shareholders must
reside in Idaho.83 The Act also exempts corporations with fewer
than 100 shareholders, 4 thereby removing the very small, pri-
marily "single family" enterprises, from state regulation. Third,
the Act waives requirements for disclosure and other protections
where the board of directors of the subject company recommends
acceptance of the tender offer.85 This "acceptance exemption"
removes the state's jurisdiction from all but contested tender offers
been provided within the Idaho Blue Sky law, Id. § 30-1447 and, through it, within the
Idaho Takeover Act. Id. § 30-1513.
78. Id. § 30-1503(4).
79. Id. § 30-1503(5).
80. Id.
81. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 65, at 172; Sommer, The Ohio Act.
What Is It? 21 CASE W. R.s. L. REv. 681, 714 (1970).
82. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6)(c), -1501(6)(d), -1501(6)(e), -1501(6)(g) (Cum. Supp.
1975). Subsections (a), (b), and (f) of paragraph (6) are, respectively, exceptions for bro-
kers' transactions, certain exempted exchange offers, and offers where the total acquisition
would not exceed two percent of any class of the outstanding equity securities of the issuer.
83. Id. § 30-1501(5)(c). The Ohio takeover statute has no such express limitation and
potentially grants jurisdiction over tender offers where no Ohio citizens are shareholders of
the target. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1977).
84. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
85. Id. § 30-1501(5)(e).
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under the theory that the directors' decision acts as a substitute for
the statute.86 Finally, the Act does not apply to offers by the sub-
ject company to acquire its own shares.87 Because none of these
exemptions operated to prevent the assertion of jurisdiction over
GWU's offer to take over Sunshine, the constitutional attack
launched in the Great Western case was the only alternative to
compliance with the Idaho Act.
II. BASES FOR UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
As previously discussed, the district court invalidated the
Idaho statute on both preemption and commerce clause grounds.
In most recent Supreme Court cases involving both commerce
clause and preemption issues, the Court's decision has been based
on preemption grounds only, leaving the commerce clause argu-
ments untouched.88 The court in Great Western, however, of-
fered alternative bases for the holding that the Idaho statute was
constitutionally infirm by addressing both claims of invalidity. 89
A. Preemption
The doctrine of preemption is used to invalidate a state law
under the supremacy clause9" when the state and federal legisla-
tion expressly or impliedly conflict.9" Although there is "no one
crystal clear distinctly marked formula,"92 it is generally recog-
nized that there are three situations in which there may be found
an implied congressional purpose to supersede state regulation.
First, "[tlhe scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it."93  Second, "the Act of Congress may
touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
86. See text accompanying notes 175-83 infra.
87. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
88. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); City of
Chicago v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patter-
son, 315 U.S. 148 (1942). See Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public Sector: Justice
Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REv. 10, 52-53 (1965); Note, Pre-
emption as a Preferential Ground." A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 219
(1959).
89. 439 F. Supp. at 434-40.
90. "This Constitution, and all the Laws of the United States ... shall be the Supreme
Law of the Land; ... anything in this Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
91. See Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942).
92. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
93. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject." 94  Third, "enforcement of state...
acts presents a serious danger of conflict with the administration
of the federal program.""5 These tests may be loosely referred to
as pervasiveness, dominance, and conflict of purposes.96
1. Pervasiveness
The court in Great Western almost summarily dismissed the
pervasiveness argument. It concluded that the forty year history
of simultaneous state and federal securities regulation indicated
that Congress, by its inaction, acquiesced in state regulation of
takeovers:97 "Such coexistence would be impossible if Congress
has occupied the field.""8
The court's reading of the facts is correct, but its application of
the law is arguably inappropriate. The court assumed that the
area under discussion was all of securities regulation, failing to
distinguish that from the narrower area of tender offers. Analysis
of preemption should begin by identifying the specific area that is
preempted. If the issue in Great Western is the regulation of se-
curities in general, then the court's analysis appears to be correct,
and existing state securities regulation precludes a pervasiveness
argument. However, if the issue is regulation of tender offers,
and if there are appropriate reasons for distinguishing the nar-
rower area, then the analysis of the pervasiveness preemption test
would be different.
Tender offers should be considered a separate area of regula-
tion because they differ both from the distribution of securities
covered by the 1933 Act and from the trading of securities covered
by the 1934 Act. Tender offers are different from distributions in
94. Id.
95. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956). All three of these preemption
tests were embraced in the Court's recent decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978) (quoting, inter alia, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
(state law preempted where it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.")).
96. Judge Hill clearly recognized and relied upon these three tests in his statement of
the preemption standard. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
97. The first securities regulation occurred at the state level in 1911. 1 L. Loss, SE-
cURTIES REGULATION 23 (2d ed. 1961). Six years later, the Supreme Court upheld such
regulation in the "Blue Sky Cases" of 1917: Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917),
Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917), Merrick v. N.W. Halsey and
Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917), in which the Court found that state regulation violated neither the
fourteenth amendment nor the commerce clause. 439 F. Supp. at 435.
98. 439 F. Supp. at 435.
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two respects. First, a tender offer is an offer to buy shares by a
party other than the issuer rather than an attempt by the issuer to
sell shares. Second, the investor does not have to make a decision
to commit assets that will expand the capital base of a corpora-
tion. If the tender offer is for cash, the decision to accept or reject
the offer is actually a consumption decision; the shareholder is not
entrusting his property to the care of third party managers as is
done in a true investment decision. The investor will be getting
some or all of his invested assets back in the form of cash. If
shares are exchanged for shares of the offeror, the investor deci-
sion in a tender offer may still be different than in an original
issue of shares. Although some of the managers of the investor's
assets may change, the assets will, in many cases, remain commit-
ted to the same type of business project that originally attracted
the investor (in addition to any other businesses of the offeror cor-
poration).
Tender offers are also different from the trading of securities
in other contexts. The purposes of purchases and sales in ordi-
nary trading are investment and profit; the result of the trading is
simply to transfer the shares of a corporation. The same purposes
and results obtain in a tender offer, but there is a major additional
result. The fundamental goal of the transaction is to effect a shift
in control of the subject company to the offeror. The atomized
investors will still be able to accomplish their profit goal in a sale
of shares in a tender offer, but afterwards a single person or entity
will own all, most, or a substantial percentage of the
shares--enough to gain control of the subject company. Unlike
the ordinary trading situations regulated by the 1934 Act and state
Blue Sky laws, the property that is being exchanged "in com-
merce" is not simply a security, but corporate control.
Thus, the investor decisions and the result of the trading in a
tender offer are different from those situations which the federal
and state securities laws traditionally covered. These factors indi-
cate that the area of tender offers is an appropriate sub-area in
which to analyze the proper roles of federal and state legislation.
This conclusion draws support from cases that have come
before the Supreme Court under preemption and commerce
clause challenges. In Maurer v. Hamilton,99 for example, the
Court addressed the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute
prohibiting the carrying of any other vehicle above the cab of a
99. 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
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truck. The Court held that the state regulation was not pre-
empted by the Motor Carrier Act of 1935100 because the federal
legislation regulated only the area of "safety and operation of
equipment,"10' and not the distinct area of "sizes and weights of
motor vehicles."102
Because GWU offered no cases excluding the states from the
field of securities regulation, the court determined that the Wil-
liams Act does not occupy the field of tender offer legislation.10 3
Had the court limited its consideration to the field of tender offer
regulation, both its conclusion and reasoning may have been dif-
ferent on the question of pervasiveness. It is not simply a ques-
tion of the number of provisions or the volume of regulation.
Rather, pervasiveness depends upon whether the provisions and
history of the federal law and the regulations promulgated there-
under, taken as a whole, create a balanced and plenary scheme.'°4
When this is reached, Congress may be said to have "taken the
particular subject matter in hand. . . and a State law is not going
to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Con-
gress has seen fit to go.' 0 5
The Williams Act and its attendant rules and regulations re-
veal a carefully balanced scheme for the regulation of tender of-
fers. This balance is most evident in the form and extent of the
regulation. In terms of extent, the Williams Act was meant to
"fill a gap in the existing scheme of investor protection;"'' 06 how-
ever, Congress specifically desired that its goal of investor protec-
tion should not unduly interfere with the usefulness of tender
offers as a mechanism for changing corporate control. 10 7 In for-
mulating the Williams Act, Congress' primary concern was pro-
100. 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1976).
101. 309 U.S. at 601.
102. Id. at 607. Even the State of Idaho referred to the relevant area as the "regula-
tion of tender offers." Memorandum of Defendants in Opposition to Motion for Declara-
tory Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 32, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F.
Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977).
103. 439 F. Supp. at 435.
104. See Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon Stale Regulation of Tender Offers,
47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1164 (1974).
105. Charleston & Western R.R. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915).
106. Takeover Bids: Hearings on H. 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm on Commerce
and Finance of the Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10
(1968) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; see GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); H.R.
REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2811, 2814 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
107. House Hearings, supra note 106.
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viding "full and fair disclosure" of specific information deemed
necessary for an informed shareholder decision. In addition, the
Williams Act sets out a comprehensive scheme of provisions to
protect investors in the exercise of their decision to tender. First,
where the offer is for less than all of the subject company's securi-
ties, the Williams Act provides that within ten days following pub-
lication of the offer deposited securities must be purchased pro
rata. 0 8  Second, shareholders who have tendered their shares
may withdraw them within the first seven days after publication
of the offer and at any time after the expiration of sixty days from
the date of the original tender offer. 09 Third, any increase in the
purchase price must also be paid to all who tendered at a lower
price.1 0 These provisions alone evince an integrated scheme of
investor protection. The SEC regulations on tender offers, in-
cluding the new disclosure requirements,"' represent additional
evidence of the completeness of the federal tender offer scheme.
Certainly nothing in the Williams Act, its enabling provisions, or
the regulations indicates incompleteness or an intention that such
regulation constitute only a minimum standard upon which states
might add their own provisions. For a state to extend its laws
beyond federal regulation evidences an unwarranted assumption
that Congress left the subject free and open, In fact, it is arguable
that these actions disturb the balanced federal scheme by raising
impediments to tender offers which Congress sought to avoid. A
state statute such as the Idaho Act that disturbs the balance should
be preempted by the pervasiveness of the federal statute.
Pervasiveness analysis in this context would not be complete
without addressing a final (and perhaps major) obstacle to the the-
ory-section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act." 2 To deter-
mine whether section 28(a) is truly an obstacle, it is necessary to
consider both the meaning of the section and the effect of incorpo-
rating the Williams Act into the Securities Exchange Act. Section
28 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction
of the securities commission (or any agency or officer performing
like functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar
as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
109. Id. § 78n(d)(5).
110. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
Ill. Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1; Schedule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-100
(1978).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
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rules and regulations thereunder."' ' 3  It is logical to infer from
the fact that the Williams Act provisions were incorporated in the
"chapter" to which section 28 refers that section 28(a) is to apply
to the tender offer provisions even though the Williams Act was
passed many years after section 28(a).14
If one assumes that section 28(a) applies to the tender offer
provisions, the next issue is the meaning of the section. Clauses
such as section 28(a) have been discounted as mere "make-weight
arguments,"I 5 and the presence or absence of such a clause is not
sufficient to resolve a preemption question." 6 In Pennsylvania v.
Nelson," 7 for example, the Court found unimportant a similar
savings provision in the United States Criminal Code." 8 It is not
necessary to go beyond the language of the second sentence of
section 28(a) to determine that it does not resolve any particular
preemption question. In fact, it only articulates what is true of
every area where there are both state and federal regulations: if
the two do not conflict, they both stand; if they conflict, the fed-
eral rule supersedes.
It can be argued that Congress has left the determination of
whether federal and state regulations conflict in a particular case
to the judiciary. If this is the case, then the argument that Con-
gress intended for state takeover statutes to be effective because it
has remained silent in the face of their proliferation loses its force.
Having impliedly stated that it will not make the decision on con-
flict, Congress' silence is meaningless.
This interpretation of the savings clause and congressional in-
tent makes sense in view of the status of state takeover legislation
and the political pressures on Congress. When the Williams Act
was passed in 1968, only one state statute regulating tender offers
was in existence." 9 Congress could not foresee then, or in 1970
when it amended the Williams Act, the rapid growth of such stat-
utes in the 1970's.112 Thus, the threat of conflicting state statutes
113. Id.
114. If § 28(a) did not apply, neither would any of the other general sections such as
§ 27 (jurisdiction of offenses and suits), § 29 (validity of contracts), and § 32 (penalties). 15
U.S.C. §§ 78aa, 78cc, 78ff(1976). Without these sections the tender offer provisions would
have little force. It is thus difficult to argue that they apply while § 28 does not.
115. Note, supra note 88, at 215.
116. Id.
117. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
118. Id. at 501 n.10. But see Sexton v. California, 189 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1903).
119. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 65, at 155 n.9 (citing VA. CODE §§ 13.1-
528 to .1-541 (Supp. 1970)).
120. Defendants contend that Congress had sufficient opportunity during the 1970
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was not then sufficiently present to prompt Congress to preempt
state legislation explicitly. Furthermore, pressure from corpora-
tions fearful of takeover has been a factor in the growth of state
takeover legislation.121 Congress, fearful of alienating corporate
constituents by explicitly preempting state takeover statutes, made
the tender offer provisions subject to the uncertain meaning of
section 28(a). As takeover statutes grew in number, section 28(a)
became the politically expedient means of addressing the conflict
problem since it left resolution of that problem to the judiciary.
In sum, the district court in Great Western too quickly dis-
missed the pervasiveness test for preemption. By not limiting the
area under consideration to tender offer regulation and by not
considering the relevance of section 28(a), the court did not prop-
erly analyze the plaintiffs potentially valid pervasiveness argu-
ment.
2. Dominance of the Federal Interest
The district court even more perfunctorily rejected the pre-
emption arguments based on dominance of the federal interest.
The court was unmoved by the plaintiffs attempt to draw an anal-
ogy between this case and City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal.'22 There the Supreme Court invalidated a local ordi-
nance which sought to prevent aircraft from taking off during cer-
tain hours of the night, holding that the Federal Aviation Act of
1958123 preempted the ordinance. While expressly stating that
the federal system of aviation regulation was so pervasive as to
preempt local aircraft noise laws, the Court also cited the need for
uniformity in aviation regulation "to insure a delicate balance be-
tween safety and efficiency. . . and the protection of persons on
the ground .. .'"124
In Great Western the court said that "Federal control of the
securities field is not 'intensive and exclusive' as is federal control
over aviation. States have a valid interest in regulation of securi-
amendments to the Williams Act, Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 3, 84 Stat.
1497 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970)), to expressly preempt state takeover legisla-
tion. They argue that since Congress did not preempt, it has impliedly permitted concur-
rent regulation. Memorandum of Defendants in Opposition to Motion for Declaratory
Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 20, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F.
Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977).
121. See, e.g., note 67 supra.
122. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
123. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
124. 411 U.S. at 638.
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ties sold within their borders and state statutes have existed regu-
lating this area for some time."''
25
This analysis has two major problems. First, the court, by us-
ing the language "intensive and exclusive," appears to have mis-
read the test, treating dominance as synonomous with
pervasiveness. 126 On the contrary, the dominance test is based on
the need for uniformity of regulation. Where there is a peculiar
national concern that the states cannot handle individually, state
regulation is precluded, whether supplementary or not. Cooley v.
Board of Wardens 27 sets forth the basic test: "Whatever subjects
of this power are in their nature national or admit only of one
uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of
such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."'
' 28
Second, the court again failed to delimit the specific area of fed-
eral interest. If the area of concern is securities regulation in gen-
eral, then, as with pervasiveness, the dominance theory would
break down. In terms of traditional Blue Sky regulation, Idaho
would have a local interest in protecting its citizens from fraudu-
lent and deceptive practices in the sale of securities. However,
assuming again that the federal interest involved is the regulation
of tender offers, the need for uniformity may be more analogous
to the Burbank situation than the court admits.
Because of the rapid and overwhelming increase in the
number of takeover acts, more than one state may assert jurisdic-
tion over the offer. Jurisdiction may conceivably be claimed in
any state in which the subject company is incorporated, has its
principal place of business, and/or has substantial assets. Where
a tender offer is made for shares of a relatively large corporation,
with assets and subsidiaries 29 spread across the country, any
number of states may seek to regulate it. In the face of this prob-
lem of multiple burdens, the Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations
and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Securities Com-
125. 439 F. Supp. at 435.
126. See id. The court's confusion may stem from the fact that Burbank speaks of
regulations being "intensive and exclusive,' but it does so in the pervasiveness argument.
411 U.S. at 633.
127. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
128. Id. at 319; accord, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 625
(1973).
129. A parent corporation's principal place of business is not necessarily that of its
subsidiaries. This opens the door to jurisdictional claims by any state in which the subject
company owns a subsidiary. See Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire Serv., Inc., 220 F.
Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (court questioned only the principal place of business of the
subsidiary, never mentioning it in terms of the principal place of business of the parent).
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mittee believed that there was a particular need for national uni-
formity in tender offer regulation. 13o The Committee thought the
existing statutes created a "mottled pattern," confusing at best,
which "may even [have created] outright conflicts of regulatory
patterns by multiple states asserting a right to regulate a given
transaction."13' The result is uncertainties in regulation which
may lead to the frustration of tender offers.
132
Furthermore, it is possible that review by several state securi-
ties commissioners and the delays of varying lengths could disrupt
trading in the stock. Uncertainty as to approval of the offer could
spark rumors, causing price fluctuations, or even a ban on trading.
Local securities regulations should not contribute to the disrup-
tion of the national market any more than local noise ordinances
should interfere with national air traffic flow. It would appear,
then, that by not limiting the legislative "area" to tender offers,
the court again made a hasty conclusion and did not confront a
potentially legitimate preemption argument.
Should the appellate court invalidate the Idaho statute on
"pervasiveness" or "dominance" grounds, the effect upon all state
130. See Note, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 187, 193
(1976); accord, Sommer, Commentary-Takeover Statutes, 32 Bus. LAW. 1483, 1486 (1977)
(former Commissioner of the SEC asserts that there ought to be preemption to avoid the
problems of multiple claims on jurisdiction and to grant uniformity to an action directed at
nationwide corporations and shareholders). But see Shipman, Some Thoughts About the
Role 0/State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Act, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 722, 759-60
(1970), in which the author suggests that there is no existing national policy regarding
tender offers.
131. Note, supra note 130, at 193; cf. Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 445
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (the City of Detroit issued regulations for air pollution standards
in its port in excess of federal standards. Said Justice Douglas, "The variety of require-
ments for equipment which the States may provide in order to meet their air pollution
needs underlines the importance of letting the coast guard license serve as authority for the
vessel to use, in all our ports, the equipment which it certifies.").
132. For an example of a tender offer which failed as a result of a state takeover stat-
ute, see the offer by Thrall Car Mfg. Co. for Youngstown Steel Door Co., discussed in E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR COR-
PORATE CONTROL 222-25 (1977). Thrall's offer failed as a result of subject company man-
agement accepting a competing offer during the period of administrative procedure. The
offer by United Technologies Corp. for The Babcock & Wilcox Co., consideredin Brown,
Changes in Offeror Strategy in Response to New Laws andRegulations, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 843, 844-45, (1978), was withdrawn by United Technologies when, as a result of a
competing bid solicited by subject company management, the offering price rose from $42
per share to $58.50 per share. United Technologies' offer for Otis Elevator Co. also failed.
Quaker State Oil and Valley Camp Agree on Merger, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1976, at 2, col. 2.
For evidence of delay and confusion caused by state takeover statutes, see the offer by
Societe Imetal for Copperweld Corp., discussed in E. ARANow, H. EINHORN, & G. BERL-
STEIN, supra at 220-21.
[Vol. 28:955
STATE TAKEOVER LAWS
takeover statutes would be devastating. Not only the Idaho Act,
but all others regardless of their provisions would fall before a
determination that the states, in effect, possess no right to legislate
for tender offers. However, the last test for preemption-whether
the state statute is "in conflict" with the purposes of the federal
statute--does not lead to such drastic results. A determination of
"conflict," as found by the district court in Great Western, has no
immediate effect upon states other than Idaho; nor would that de-
termination preclude Idaho from amending its takeover statute to
harmonize with the Williams Act.
3. Conflict
Although section 28 of the 1934 Act may cast doubt upon the
application of other preemption methods, it expressly provides for
preemption where the state statute conflicts with the provisions,
rules, or regulations of the federal law. 33 The legislature does
not, however, define what is meant by "conflict," leaving it to the
courts to formulate the proper test. Either of two tests may be
applied. The stricter test, argued for by the State of Idaho, de-
fines conflict as existing only where it is impossible to comply with
the provisions of both state and federal statutes. 134 This test for-
bids only the most obvious violations of the supremacy clause.
The Idaho Act does not appear to create this kind of conflict.
However, there are other possible interpretations of "conflict" that
are less stringent. The test for conflict most often applied by the
Supreme Court was enunciated in Hines v. Davidowitz: 35 the
court's inquiry must be whether, under the circumstances of the
particular case, the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."' 36  Because the difference in purposes between the
Idaho Act and the Williams Act is so great, the conflict may well
be strong enough to meet this test of preemption. Under this test,
the court first had to construe both the Williams Act and the
Idaho Takeover Act before ruling on whether they conflicted. 37
A major problem, however, in determining conflict in purposes of
133. See text accompanying notes 112-18 supra.
134. 439 F. Supp. at 437.
135. 312 U.S. 52 (1928).
136. Id. at 67; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977); accordDe Canas
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971); Florida
Lime Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963).
137. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
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tender offer regulation is that nowhere has any legislative body
made an express value judgment regarding the desirability of
tender offers. All analysis must be drawn by inference from the
legislative history of the Williams Act or, in the case of the Idaho
Act, from its practical effects.
The court discerned that the overall purpose of the Williams
Act was to "balance the scales equally to protect the legitimate
interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders with-
out unduly impeding cash takeover bids." 3 ' This interpretation
is in keeping with a recent construction of the Williams Act by the
Supreme Court in Piter v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. '3 9 In Chris-
Craft, the Court denied standing to an unsuccessful tender offeror
who subsequently sued under section 14(e) of the Williams Act.
The Court concluded that Congress "was. . . committed to a pol-
icy of neutrality in contests for corporate control .... ,,140 and did
not intend that the disclosure requirement favor either the offeror
or subject company management.' 41
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. ' 42 offered a similar construc-
tion of the Williams Act. There the subject company sought un-
successfully to obtain an injunction against the offeror for harm
alleged as a result of failing to file a Schedule 13D. In concluding
that the subject company suffered no harm reachable by the Wil-
liams Act, the Court considered the purposes of the federal stat-
ute:
By requiring disclosure of information to the target corporation
as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission, Congress
intended to do no more than give incumbent management an
opportunity to express and explain its position. The Congress
expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for man-
agement to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumu-
lations of stock which would create the potential for such
attempts. 143
By taking "extreme care" to ensure that the regulation gave
neither subject company management nor the offeror a tactical
advantage, Congress ultimately preserved the tender offer from
138. 439 F. Supp. at 436 (quoting Introduction to S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113
CONG. REC. 854 (1967)).
139. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
140. Id. at 29.
141. Id. at 30.
142. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
143. Id. at 58.
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frustration or destruction.1"I Thus, although the Williams Act
contains no value judgment, per se, concerning the desirability of
tender offers, Congress did recognize that they should not be dis-
couraged "because they serve a useful purpose in providing a
check on entrenched but inefficient management."' 14
5
The court in Great Western found that the purposes of the
Idaho Takeover Act differed substantially from the objectives of
the Williams Act. 146 Rather than being a logical extension of the
federal regulation, as some have characterized state takeover acts
generally, 47 the Idaho statute was found to preclude tender offers
and give subject management a tactical advantage over the of-
feror. More specifically, the court found that the Idaho Act pro-
vides (1) more detailed information, (2) undue delay, and (3) an
"acceptance" exemption, all of which are in conflict with the pur-
poses of the Williams Act. 14
8
The court first found that the information required by the Act
in excess of SEC regulations was "only collaterally related to that
information that a shareholder would require in deciding whether
or not to tender his stock."' 149 The court's analysis, however, was
conclusory. It failed either to articulate what information re-
quired by the state extends beyond a Schedule 13D disclosure or
to define the scope of information sufficient for a shareholder to
reach a decision. Closer analysis reveals a greater correlation be-
tween federal and state disclosure requirements than the court im-
plied. Section 30-1503(2) of the Idaho Act requires disclosure of
[m]aterial information concerning the organization and opera-
tions of any offeror which is a corporation, including the year,
form and jurisdiction of its organization, a description of each
class of its capital stock and long-term debt, a description of the
business done by the offeror and its subsidiaries and any mate-
144. See id. at 58-59; Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937, 945 (2d Cir. 1969); HousE REPORT, supra note 106, at 2813.
145. HoUSE REPORT, sulra note 106, at 2813. The State of Ohio in its amicus brief to
the Fifth Circuit argued that tender offers rarely result in ousting target management: "One
of the primary assets which the offeror seeks to obtain in acquiring the target corporation is
the management .... " Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of Ohio at 8, Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2809 (5th
Cir. Sept. 16, 1977). However, since Congress has determined that tender offers do have
that effect, the possible existence of facts to the contrary does not change the federal pur-
pose behind the Williams Act and thus should not preclude a finding of conflict between
the federal and state purposes.
146. 439 F. Supp. at 436, 437.
147. See Shipman, supra note 130, at 758.
148. 439 F. Supp. at 436.
149. Id.
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rial changes therein during the past three. . . years, a descrip-
tion of the location and character of the principal properties of
the offeror and its subsidiaries, a description of any material
pending legal or administrative proceedings in which the of-
feror or any of its subsidiaries is a party, the names of all direc-
tors and executive officers of the offeror and their material
business activities and affiliations during the past three . . .
years and financial statements of the offeror for its three...
most recent annual accounting periods and any current pe-
riod[,] 150
plus any further information deemed material by the director.' 5 '
Contrary to the court's opinion, the disclosures under the Act are
duplicative in material part of those required to be filed under the
Williams Act. This is particularly so in light of the adoption by
the SEC of new, more stringent rules regulating disclosure by the
parties to a tender offer.' 52 The Commission amended Schedule
13D expressly "to make the information therein more meaningful
to investors .... ,,153 The new Schedule 14D-l, 154 which re-
placed Schedule 13D, does differ from the state statute in certain
respects, however. For example, Schedule 14D-1 does not pro-
vide for a description of long-term debt, nor does it require infor-
mation concerning the location of properties belonging to the
offeror and its subsidiaries. The Idaho Act further requires, as
the federal regulations do not, a description of business operations
of the offeror and subsidiaries and any material changes in the
past three years."' The court specifically mentioned this addi-
tion to the Act as an example of information only "collaterally
related" to a shareholder's decision.' 56 As noted earlier, the court
set no guidelines to indicate what it considered material to a
shareholder. 157  Under the 1934 Act materiality is defined in rule
12b-2(j): "The term 'material', when used to qualify a require-
ment for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the
information required to those matters as to which an average pru-
150. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(2)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
151. Id. § 30-1503(3).
152. Exchange Act Release No. 13291 (Feb. 1977), reprinted in [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,980. The new rules became effective August 31,
1977. It should be noted that this additional disclosure now required by the federal regu-
lation does not apply retroactively to cover GWU's filing in Great Western. It does, how-
ever, possess ramifications for the future of the Idaho Act.
153. Id.
154. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1978).
155. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975). See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1707.041(B)(3)(g) (Page Supp. 1975); VA. CODE § 13.1-531(b) (vii) (1978).
156. 439 F. Supp. at 436.
157. See text accompanying notes 149-50 supra.
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dent investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or
selling the securities registered."' 8 In a normal registration, the
disclosure generally required is that which would be important to
a sophisticated investor.' 59  Without further guidance from the
court, it is difficult to conclude that the additional information
required by the Idaho Act is not of interest to shareholders and
thus, intended to give subject management extra information with
which to block the offer.'
60
The argument might also be raised that the additional disclo-
sure required under the Idaho Act unnecessarily burdens the of-
feror, who must incur additional cost and time to prepare the
information. Although the SEC, in promulgating the new regula-
tions, sought to make disclosure more meaningful to investors, it
also desired to make "to the extent feasible, the reporting of that
information less burdensome to beneficial owners."'' It should
be noted, however, that the disclosure required by section
30-1503(2) of the Idaho Act is substantially equivalent to the dis-
closure requirements in Registration Form S-1162 pursuant to the
Securities Act of 1933. Assuming GWU is registered under the
1933 Act as a result of the issuance of its securities, the additional
information required by the Idaho Act will have been filed with
the SEC and perhaps even continuously updated both annually
and quarterly under the 1934 Act.1 63  If so, GWU and other cor-
porations similarly situated should have no great difficulty pre-
paring the additional information required by the State of Idaho
beyond updating for the immediate quarter and incorporating the
S-1 reports into the section 30-1503(2) disclosure. Thus, the
more stringent federal disclosure requirements and the possible
existence of either a current S-1 report or periodic reports under
158. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1977).
159. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
160. Schedule 14D-1 extends beyond state requirements in other areas. Item four asks
for a description of the offeror's source and amount of funds used in the tender offer. Item
five requires the offeror to define in detail the purpose of the tender offer for subject com-
pany securities. And, Item seven asks for disclosure of all understandings, contracts, and
arrangements between the offeror and subject company concerning subject company secur-
ities. Schedule 14D-1, 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-100 (1978).
161. Exchange Act Release No. 13291, supra note 152.
162. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1977).
163. Pursuant to § 13(a) and § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 every
registrant under the Securities Act of 1933 or falling within § 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 must file a form 10-K annual report and a form 10-Q quarterly report. 17
C.F.R. §§ 249.308a-.310 (1977). In addition, the registrant is required to file a form 8-K
current report upon the occurrence of any one of the events specified therein. 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.308 (1977).
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the 1934 Act 164 weaken the court's conclusion that the additional
information required by the Idaho Act serves to favor incumbent
management in conflict with the objectives of the Williams Act.
The court found stronger evidence of conflict in the delay im-
posed by the preoffer notification and hearing procedures of the
Idaho Act. 165 Under section 30-1503(1) the offeror must publicly
disclose the terms of the proposed offer simultaneously with regis-
tration.1 66  Although there is no waiting period per se,167 the
tender offer is not effective until it is approved by the state direc-
tor of finance. 68 At the very least, several days pass between
public notification and the initial viability of the offer. It is very
likely, however, that this waiting period will be extended. The
director may, at his discretion or upon the request of subject man-
agement, further postpone the offer pending a hearing on the reg-
istration. 69  The Idaho Act's preoffer notification and hearing
provisions thus eliminate the elements of surprise and speed upon
which an effective tender offer depends. A prime advantage of
tender offers over proxy contests and mergers as a means of ac-
quiring corporate control is that the latter two transactions are ul-
timately controlled by subject company management, while the
tender offeror is able to deal directly with the shareholders. 7 ' By
providing advance warning of the offer, the Idaho Act grants sub-
ject company management time to marshal its defense tactics
against the attempted takeover. 7' During the delay, speculative
purchases might drive the price of subject company shares to a
level prohibitive for the tender offeror. The ultimate effect of de-
lay, then, is to discourage tender offers from being made.
The delay tactics of section 30-1503 may also operate contrary
to the best interests of subject company shareholders-a result in-
consistent with the purposes not only of the Williams Act but also
of the Idaho Act. Delay disrupts the securities market, causing
164. See id.
165. 439 F. Supp. at 436.
166. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
167. Several states have a nondiscretionary preoffer waiting period which may further
be extended by a hearing on the adequacy of disclosure. See, e.g., MD. CoPi,. & ASS'NS.
CODE ANN. § 11-902(a); N.Y. Bus. CoPi. LAW § 1602 (McKinney Supp. 1977-78); OHIO
Rav. CODE ANN. § 1707.04 1(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1977), all of which require disclosure 20
days prior to the offer being made. VA. CODE § 13.1-531(C), disclosure is required 10
days prior to the offer being made.
168. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(3) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
169. Id. § 30-1503(4).
170. Morse, Economic Realities of Cash Tender Offers, 20 ME. L. REv. 237, 240 (1968).
171. E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G. BEU.STEIN, supra note 132, at 217-20.
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uncertainty and confusion over whether the offer will take place
and at what price.' 72 As rumors of prices circulate, the share-
holders may be left even more confused. 73  Furthermore, they
might be entirely denied access to the marketplace and its infor-
mation if the New York Stock Exchange halts trading in the
stock. 174  It is important to keep in mind that under the Williams
Act the decision to tender shares rests entirely with the share-
holder, not with subject management. The price at which share-
holders relinquish their shares cannot be arbitrarily manipulated
via hearings to suit the director of finance or subject management,
regardless of their intentions. By approving a delay which may
force the Exchange to halt trading in the subject company shares
for the duration of the investigation, the director can effectively
prevent access to the market for all shareholders. Moreover, de-
lay may result in no bid at all if the tender offer fails. Thus, not
only could the shareholders not sell quickly at a profit they con-
sider adequate, they may be prevented from realizing any profit.
However much the preoffer notification and hearing provi-
sions may favor incumbent management, the Idaho Act's "accept-
ance exemption' 75 appears to be more favorable still, and works
even greater harm to the balance between offeror and subject
company so carefully struck by the Williams Act. The court
found that this provision, exempting from regulation any offer to
which the management of the subject company consents and rec-
ommends acceptance, created a serious conflict with the purposes
of the Williams Act.'76
172. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 161
(1973); Sommer, Commentar-Takeover Statutes, 32 Bus. LAW. 1483, 1486-87 (1977).
173. See Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, 403 F. Supp. 579, 608 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
174. Takeover Bids: Hearings on H-. 14475, S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce
and Finance of the Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 46
(1968) (statement of Donald L. Calvin) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]. Mr. Cal-
vin, vice-president of the New York Stock Exchange in 1968, testified that it is the policy of
the Exchange to halt trading in a security where there are "rumors linked to a tender of-
fer," id, during the period in which the offer is under review. Even a 5-day preoffer
requirement, he believed, would trigger sufficient market disruptions to stop trading in the
subject company's securities. It is not inconceivable that the state director would take five
days to approve the offer-at least there is nothing to prevent him from doing so. If five
days will create havoc, how much more so would a 20-day or 60-day delay while awaiting
the results of a hearing on the offer?
175. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(e) (Cum. Supp. 1975). This section exempts from the
definition of tender offer "[an offer as to which the target company, acting through its
board of directors, recommends acceptance to its stockholders if the offer is made to all
stockholders on substantially equal terms." See text accompanying notes 85-86 supra.
176. 439 F. Supp. at 436-37.
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It has been argued by some that the subject company's board
of directors would adequately serve as a substitute for the statute
by investigating the fairness and adequacy of disclosures.177 This
theory assumes that subject management, in response to a fiduci-
ary duty, will always work in the best interest of its shareholders.
Referring to an analogous provision in the Ohio Takeover Act,
one commentator explained the problem with this assumption:
Although under Subsection (F), the Division of Securities is not
compelled to exempt a take-over bid which is approved and
recommended by the management of a target company, 78
there is at least a statutory indication that approval by manage-
ment somehow carries with it a reduction of the need for ade-
quate disclosure to the shareholders. One wonders why. This
exemptive provision raises what can amount to a statutory au-
thorization or sanction of conflict of interest situations. If
management of the target company strikes a deal with the of-
feror, then the chances of an exemption are enhanced, even
though such circumstances may create even greater reason for
disclosure to the target company shareholders.' 79
Conflicts of interest appear most clearly in proxy contests 80 in
which the board often uses the proxy machinery in violation of its
fiduciary duty, as a means of perpetuating itself in office.' 8 '
Analogizing from the proxy situation, the potential exists for sub-
ject management to "strike a deal" with the tender offeror, con-
trary to the best interests of shareholders, to keep itself in
power.18 2 If so, then shareholders need just as much protection
from their own management as they do from an offeror.
This particular exemption is thus inconsistent with the articu-
lated purposes of the Idaho statute-protection of subject com-
pany shareholders. It does not, by itself, create a conflict with the
purposes of the Williams Act, as do the preoffer notification and
hearing requirements, since the Williams Act provisions requiring
information disclosure will still operate. However, when viewed
in the context of the entire Idaho takeover statute, this exemption
177. See Shipman, supra note 130, at 729.
178. It appears that the Idaho director has no choice not to exempt an approved take-
over bid because an offer which is accepted is not defimed as a "take-over offer." IDAHO
CODE § 30-1501(5)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
179. Memorandum accompanying letter from Professor Ronald J. Coffey to Senator
William W. Taft (Apr. 3, 1969), quoted in Sommer, The Ohio TakeoverAct: What Is It?, 21
CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 681, 694 (1970).
180. See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1489
(1970).
181. Id. at 1495.
182. Id.
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is another means by which the statute eases incumbent manage-
ment's maintenance of control. The Idaho "acceptance" exemp-
tion greatly contributes to the conclusion that the statute's purpose
is to protect and favor incumbent management. i 3 The overall
conflict of purposes between the Idaho Act and the Williams Act
then becomes apparent. A statute that protects or favors subject
management is antithetical to the carefully balanced federal
scheme which seeks to protect shareholders while maintaining the
viability of tender offers as a means of ousting inefficient subject
management.
After setting out these three general Idaho require-
ments-more disclosure, hearing provisions, and exemption from
filing where management accepts the tender offer-without signif-
icant discussion, the court found it "evident" that the Idaho Take-
over Act conflicts with the Williams Act "by destroying the
careful balance struck in the Williams Act between the offeror
and the management of the target company designed to protect
the interests of the shareholders."' 4  The court should have
strengthened its conclusion by looking to other sections of the stat-
ute that more convincingly indicate a conflict between the state
and federal regulation.
For example, section 30-1503(4) states that the "take-over of-
fer becomes effective when approved by the director."'' 8 5 The di-
rector appears to have wide latitude in approving or disapproving
a tender offer. Section 30-1503(5) provides three grounds for the
denial of registration of an offer: lack of full disclosure, failure to
make the offer to all shareholders on substantially equal grounds,
or a violation of the Idaho Blue Sky law. 8 6 The statute further
permits the commissioner of securities to deny effectiveness if the
offering is not in the "public interest."'8 7 Unfortunately, the stat-
ute provides no further development of the term "public inter-
est."' 8 The effect of this basis of disapproval is to turn the Idaho
183. One offeror has attempted to take this exemption one step further. In Scott v.
Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44 (D.N.J. 1974), the defendants contended that since they
acquired control with the knowledge and cooperation of incumbent management, they had
no obligation to file a Schedule 13D statement. Id. at 53. The court held that even
though management consented to the offer, defendants were required to file a Schedule
13D to protect both stockholders and the investing public. Id. at 54.
184. 439 F. Supp. at 437.
185. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
186. Id. § 30-1503(5).
187. Id. § 30-1413.
188. See Shapiro & Sachs, Blue Sky Law and Practice: An Overview, 4 U. BALT. L.
Rv. 1 (1974).
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takeover statute into the same kind of statute as the Idaho blue
sky law- one in which the state decides the actual merit of the
transaction and may forbid it even though some individuals
would still choose to participate after full disclosure.
At first blush, merit regulation of tender offers would seem to
be a natural companion to the Blue Sky statute. A closer look,
however, indicates that this may not be so, because tender offer
regulation would appear to be an area where a complementary
system of merit regulation does not merely go beyond the federal
scheme but conflicts with it. State Blue Sky laws will typically
regulate at the time of the initial offering in that state, and, al-
though time is important, it is not necessarily a key factor in the
success of an issue of stock. By contrast, time is essential in
tender offers, 8 9 and congressional intent in the Williams Act was
to allow tender offers to proceed. 90 Taking away a key element
of tender offers, as is possible under the provisions of the Idaho
Act along the lines of Blue Sky merit regulation, would directly
conflict with the federal act.
Nevertheless, the Great Western court's absolute certainty that
the Idaho statute conflicted with the federal act may create an er-
roneous impression that the issue is an easy one. Certainly, the
controversy raised by these provisions cannot be lightly discarded
by either proponents or opponents of the Act; the issue demands
closer analysis than that afforded by the court. Questions left un-
answered concerning the scope of material disclosure and the bur-
den or lack thereof on the offeror to meet excessive disclosure
requirements, as well as the failure to consider other relevant sec-
tions of the statute, weaken the court's conclusion. On the other
hand, evidence concerning the effects of Idaho's preoffer notifica-
tion and hearing provisions upon both shareholders and tender
offers appears to contrast sharply with the federal regulation's ob-
jective of protecting investors without inhibiting tender offers.
For this reason, the court's ultimate conclusion, if not its analysis,
seems correct.
B. Commerce Clause
The court addressed as a separate issue the potential invalidity
of the Idaho Takeover Act under the commerce clause. The court
was not mandated to do so. Since federal legislation exists in the
189. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
190. See text accompanying notes 106-11 supra.
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field, the court might just as easily have subsumed the commerce
clause issue under the preemption argument of "dominance."
Both tests ostensibly require a balancing of local interests and the
need for national uniformity of regulation. 191 As one commenta-
tor observed,
[TJhe Court has adopted the same weighing of interests ap-
proach in preemption cases that it uses to determine whether a
state law unjustifiably burdens interstate commerce. In a
number of situations the Court has invalidated statutes on the
preemption ground when it appeared that the state laws sought
to favor local economic interests at the expense of the interstate
market. On the other hand, when the Court has been satisfied
that valid local interests, such as those in safety or in the repu-
table operation of local business, outweigh the restrictive effect
on interstate commerce, the Court has rejected the preemption
argument and allowed state regulation to stand.' 92
Thus, preemption is useful as an initial means of deciding the is-
sue without resort to the more basic-and hence more perma-
nent-grounds under the commerce clause. Preemption is a
potentially less permanent bar to state regulation because, in the
last analysis, Congress controls the extent of state power. While
invalidation by means of a "dominance" preemption theory
means that the state's right to legislate on a subject has been su-
perseded by federal laws as a result of the need for a uniform
national policy, nothing would prevent Congress from altering na-
tional policy expressly to permit concurrent state regulation. 193
On the other hand, where a court has invalidated a state law
strictly under the commerce clause, that flexibility diminishes sig-
nificantly and perhaps disappears. 'The traditional doctrine of
Cooley v. Board of Wardens'94 states explicitly: "If the Constitu-
tion excluded the States from making any law regulating com-
merce, certainly Congress cannot regrant or in any manner
reconvey to the States that power,."195 Occasionally in this cen-
tury, however, the Court has spoken of the power of Congress to
define the- limit of its power under the commerce clause and,
thereby, to consent to particular state action which the Court had
191. Compare the "dominance" test in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
229-30 (1947), with the standard in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851).
192. Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground- 4 New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. Rav. 208, 220-21 (1959) (footnotes omitted). See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 357-60 (9th ed. 1975).
193. Note, supra note 192, at 225.
194. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
195. Id. at 316.
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forbidden. 196  This has not proven a consistent doctrine, 197 and it
is therefore uncertain how the Court would treat the issue today.
If the Court follows the Cooley doctrine, the district court's find-
ing of invalidity in this case might create an absolute prohibition
of all state takeover acts. If it follows instead the more permissive
rationale, the difference in impact between invalidation based on
preemption and invalidation based on the commerce clause would
shrink; however, the difficulty inherent in getting Congress to
carve out power to the states would probably preclude that differ-
ence from disappearing altogether. 98
In invalidating the Idaho Act under the commerce clause, the
court applied the general test found in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.: 199 "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits .... ." The Pike test merely restates
196. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
The Court's position on these occasions is best articulated in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100,
119 (1890) and Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422 (1946).
197. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 61 (1940)
(Hughes, C.J., dissenting).
198. Several reasons exist why the district court would want, and perhaps be obligated,
to discuss the Act's effects upon interstate commerce as a separate issue. First, the court's
incorrect reading of the "dominance" test for preemption--treating it as synonomous with
"pervasiveness", see text accompanying notes 125-28 supra-may have precluded it from
recognizing the congruence between the preemption and commerce clause tests. More
importantly, Great Western presents a case of first impression. This court may have per-
ceived its opportunity to set the stage for all subsequent litigation of state takeover statutes.
As such, it was important that all issues be at least presented so that the decision would
become precedent, absent a contrary ruling on appeal, for all significant issues raised. The
commerce clause issue may be sufficiently similar to the "dominance" argument to be in-
corporated within it; yet the effects of invalidating the Idaho Act under one theory rather
than the other differ enough so that the commerce clause issue merits independent consid-
eration.
199. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
200. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 437-38 (N.D. Tex. 1977),
appealdocketed, No. 77-2807 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)). The Court in Pike continued as follows:
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
397 U.S. at 142.
Judge Hill's choice of Pike as the standard for determining a commerce clause violation
was unexplained, but it appears to have been vindicated by the Supreme Court's recent
reliance on Pike in Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). In
Raymond, only four members of the Court joined the opinion in which the Pike balancing
test was quoted as controlling. Id. at 797. However, the concurring opinion questioned
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more clearly the basic uniformity versus locality test applied by
the Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona:2°"
In the application of these principles some enactments may be
found to be plainly within and other plainly without state
power. But between these extremes lies the infinite variety of
cases in which regulation of local matters may also operate as a
regulation of commerce, in which reconciliation of the conflict-
ing claims of state and national power is to be attained only by
some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands
of the state and national interests involved.2 °2
The court in Great Western interpreted Pike to impose a three-
pronged test for validity of a state statute.20 3
1. Legitimate Local Interest
Under the first prong of the test, the court concluded that the
Idaho Act was "neither legitimate nor local in its application." 20 4
Unfortunately, in reaching this conclusion the court either omitted
steps in the analysis or misinterpreted the established tests. It
omitted steps by not exploring all the possible state interests. It
misinterpreted the established tests by finding an interest-as op-
posed to a burden-illegitimate, and by scrutinizing the "local ap-
plication" of the statute.
The court interpreted the "local interest" phrase to require a
statute's effect to cease at the state lines.20 5 A statute that affects
citizens outside the state could not, therefore, be achieving a "lo-
cal" interest. This statement taken to its extreme is not necessar-
ily true. For example, state corporation laws govern the
relationship between the shareholders and the corporation and its
directors, no matter where the shareholders live. The state's in-
terest in regulating that relationship is still legitimate and local, 206
the appropriateness of balancing state with national interests only in the context of state
safqy regulations. Id. at 798. Otherwise, it appears to have been presumed in Raymond
that in nonsafety areas, such as in Pike itself, balancing national interests with legitimate
state interests is the proper method of analysis. Id.
201. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
202. Id. at 768-69.
203. According to the court, the Idaho Act
must first, effectuate a legitimate local public interest; second, affect interstate
commerce only incidentally and; third, if the first two tests are met, meet a
balancing test applied to determine whether or not the burden imposed on
commerce is excessive in relationship to the alleged local benefits provided in
the statute.
439 F. Supp. at 438.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 438-39.
206. Cf. South Carolina State Hy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)
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even though it may affect people outside the state. As with pre-
emption, the Great Western court rejected the Idaho Act's articu-
lated purpose-the "protection of shareholders of corporations
which are incorporated in or have significant connections with the
controlling state" 2 7-- in favor of examining the "practical effects"
of the statute on interstate commerce.2 °8 Support for the "practi-
cal effects" test can be found in numerous decisions of the
Supreme Court. In Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,2 °9 the
Court held that an express legislative purpose did not necessarily
govern the validity of a state enactment.2 10  Rather, "[i]t is open
to [the plaintiff] to show that in their practical operation [the stat-
ute's] provisions directly burden or destroy interstate com-
merce."
211
In looking beyond the express statutory purpose and applying
the "practical effects" test, the court made two analytical errors.
First, it hypothesized effects. Second, it assumed that the purpose
it discerned-protection of incumbent management and of the
state's economic welfare-was illegitimate.
While it is true that the court was hampered in its search for
effects by the lack of administrative history under the Idaho Act
and was forced to turn to hypothesis, the degree of uncertainty
associated with each hypothesis weakens the analysis. The only
certain effect the court pointed to was the fact that a subject com-
pany could delay the offer by requesting a hearing, which must be
granted.212 The other "effects" were simply possibilities for
which the court supplied little or no supporting evidence or analy-
sis. It was suggested that the statute "might dissuade a potential
offeror from making an offer" 213 if it has to comply with one or
more "onerous" state statutes. Neither evidence nor authority
was cited for this conclusion. The court went on to say that a
statute might keep the initial offer low. The court overlooked an
(Court recognized that the state had a local interest in assuring the safety of its highways
even though the exercise of its legislative authority pursuant to that interest created effects
beyond state borders and into interstate commerce).
207. 439 F. Supp. at 438.
208. Id.
209. 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
210. Id. at 10.
211. Id; accord, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 144 (1970); Shafer v. Farm-
ers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 198, 200 (1925); Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291,
309 (1923); Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 59 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
212. 439 F. Supp. at 439.
213. Id. at 438.
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equally logical cause for a company making a lower offer to
shareholders than to management. It is true that management ac-
ceptance of an offer will obviate compliance with the Idaho stat-
ute, but it can be argued that a greater incentive for sweetening
the offer to management would be a significant reduction of the
risk of failure, regardless of the existence of state statutes. Thus,
although freedom from compliance is an ancillary benefit of man-
agement's acceptance of an offer, it can hardly be said to be a
large enough motivation so as to create a causal connection be-
tween the offering price and the statute.
As another practical effect, the court suggested that the offeror
might reduce its original offering price as a consequence of delay-
ing tactics permitted by the statute."14 This effect would not seem
to be an expected result of the market process. News of a take-
over attempt usually contributes to a rise in market price as arbi-
trageurs buy up shares.21 5 The price rise would diminish the
margin between the market price and the offering price. Any re-
duction in the offering price further reduces that margin, provides
less incentive for shareholders to tender, and lowers the chance of
success. It would not make sense for an offeror to lower the
probability of success by reducing the offering price. This "prac-
tical effect" thus has little connection with reality. Of the court's
four suggested effects, only one-the subject company's ability to
delay-is either present or reasonably grounded in reality. Al-
though the court's analysis may not be sound, its conclusion that
the statute's purpose is protection of incumbent management is
not so unreasonable. Since the management of an Idaho-based
corporation provided the Idaho legislature with a draft of the stat-
ute,216 there is at least circumstantial evidence that the law was
designed to protect the interests of incumbent management in lim-
iting the use of tender offers in Idaho.
The court's second analytical error-assuming that protection
of the state's economic well-being is illegitimate-is more serious
and created further problems in the court's reasoning. Certainly
the arguments against a legitimate state purpose are not so over-
powering as to preclude the necessity for further analysis.
214. Id.
215. Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466, 470
(1971). For a discussion of the role played by arbitrageurs in tender offers, see E. ARA-
NOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 172, at 173.
216. See note 67 supra.
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The Idaho Act may be a reaction to an underlying fear that the
acquiring corporation after takeover will either liquidate the sub-
ject company or move it out of state, resulting in loss of business
and employment. 217  By apparently seeking to protect incumbent
management, the legislature may have attempted to protect the
state's economic well-being. Citing to language in H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond,21 8 the court held this interest to be per se illegiti-
mate.21 9 The court is not alone in its conclusion. At least one
commentator has offered an extensive list of Supreme Court deci-
sions220 to prove that a statute which preserves a state's interest in
its economic welfare is per se illegitimate. 22 1 This position finds
more specific support in the language of Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. :222 "[T]he Court has viewed with particular suspicion state
statutes requiring business operations to be performed elsewhere.
Even where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest,
this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtu-
ally per se illegal. '2 2 3  This analysis appears to be misleading.
Legislation which seeks ultimately to protect a state's economic
opportunities is not necessarily an illegitimate exercise of the
state's power. In Pike the Court did not declare the state's inter-
est illegitimate. On the contrary, it recognized the state's interest,
if tenuous, "in having the company's canteloupes identified as
originating in Arizona," but held that the burden on commerce
imposed by the statute was "per se illegal. '224 In other cases as
well, the Court did not question the legitimacy of the state's inter-
est in keeping business and employment. Rather, the Court has
generally applied a balancing test to measure the legitimate eco-
nomic interest of the state against its effect on interstate com-
merce.225  Applying to tender offers the general principle that a
217. Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687, 690 (1975);
Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1133, 1158 (1974).
218. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
219. 439 F. Supp. at 438.
220. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); Johnson v. Haydel, 278
U.S. 16 (1928), citedin Note, supra note 217, at 1159.
221. Note, supra note 217, at 1159.
222. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
223. Id. at 145. This analysis was also followed in Langevoort, State Tender Offer
Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competence, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 252
(1977).
224. 397 U.S. at 145.
225. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328-29 (1977); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
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state may legitimately protect its economic welfare, the state might
arguably effectuate that interest by protecting incumbent manage-
ment who would keep both jobs and businesses in state.226 A suc-
cessful tender offer, particularly by a foreign offeror, raises a
legitimate concern of both job and business displacement. Cer-
tainly, the State of Idaho could be said to have a legitimate inter-
est in legislating to prevent possible adverse economic effects
resulting from the acquiring corporation taking such action.
Once the court determined that the statute's purpose of pro-
tecting incumbent management was illegitimate, it ended its
search for statutory purposes. It did not investigate the possibility
that the State of Idaho may also have a legitimate interest in regu-
lating tender offers pursuant to its power to regulate the internal
affairs of corporations. Though this constitutes the appellant's
major argument on appeal," 7 the court failed to discuss its merit.
It has been argued that a takeover bid is essentially just such an
internal affairs transaction which a state may reasonably regu-
late."2 The theory concerns regulation under the substantive law
of corporations of matters involving ownership and control simi-
lar to a proxy contest. According to the major proponent of this
theory, the relationship between offeror and offeree in a tender
offer creates a "de facto proxy solicitation"; 22 9 the decision to
tender shares effectively elects officers and determines policy.
The internal affairs argument has the added benefit of justifying
the possible extraterritorial reach of the Idaho Act, since the
state's protection is based not on territoriality but on the internal
workings of an in-state corporation.230
Criticism of the internal affairs doctrine traditionally focuses
on two arguments: the lack of an existing relationship between the
offeror and offerees, and the propriety of regulation by a state of
foreign corporations. First, opponents of the doctrine maintain
that a tender offer does not concern the internal affairs of the cor-
356 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-40 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928);
Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16, 16-17 (1928); Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U.S.
421, 426 (1921).
226. Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAm L. REV. 1, 18 (1976).
227. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 8-9, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F.
Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977).
228. Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio
TakeoverAct, 21 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 722, 741 (1970).
229. Id. at 744.
230. Id. at 750.
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poration, governed by the fiduciary relationship existing between
the managers and shareholders.231 Such a relationship arises in a
proxy contest in which the successful party, usually a controlling
shareholder, will acquire a fiduciary relationship to the corpora-
tion and other shareholders. It is argued, however, that a proxy
contest occurs within the framework of existing corporate rela-
tionships, whereas in the tender offer situation, the offeror is an
outsider, a potential shareholder, who has not yet formed a rela-
tionship with the subject company.232
Nonetheless, a tender offer may be more analogous to a proxy
contest than critics recognize. Both are often used to acquire con-
trol over the corporation. The regulation of tender offers may be
construed as the regulation of the internal affairs of a corporation
by the application of the anticipatory fiduciary duty doctrine.
Judge Learned Hand first articulated this doctrine in Gratz v.
Claughton.233 In that case, the Second Circuit imposed a fiduci-
ary duty on insiders--directors, officers, and beneficial owners of
ten percent or more of the corporation's securities-in the sale of
securities to persons not yet shareholders.2 34  The doctrine envi-
sions a transaction, not with an existing corporate beneficiary, but
with one whose purchase makes him a beneficiary.2 35 The reason
for the doctrine is that a director, officer, or beneficial owner pos-
sesses information not readily accessible to existing or potential
shareholders. 36 Judge Hand argued in Gratz that a potential
shareholder has a right, before final commitment of his assets to
the corporation, to rely upon the seller to act with complete can-
dor and in the best interests of the potential shareholders. 37 If
this duty of candor exists after the shareholder's assets are com-
mitted to the enterprise, then that relationship will exist before, as
well, because that is where it is most needed to protect the pur-
chaser who reasonably relies upon the representations of the
seller.2 38 The SEC has approved the doctrine of anticipatory fi-
duciary duty in Cady, Roberts & Co.2 39 with regard to rule lOb-5
23 1. See Greenfield, Regulation of Contested Cash Tender Offers, 46 TExAs L. REV.
915 (1968); Note, supra note 217, at 1154-55.
232. Note, supra note 217, at 1154-55.
233. 187 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
234. Id. at 49.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 40 S.E.C. 907, 914 n.23 (1961).
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actions by a defrauded purchaser against directors, officers, or
others with "inside" information. As the Chairman noted:
There is no valid reason why persons who purchase stock from
an officer, director or other person having the responsibilities
of an "insider" should not have the same protection afforded
by disclosure of special information as persons who sell stock to
them. Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law
based on the view that an officer or director may stand in a
fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom he
purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it
is clearly not appropriate to introduce these into the broader
anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities acts.240
Although nominally a purchasing outsider, the acquiring cor-
poration: in a tender offer arguably stands in the position of the
insider beneficial owner of Gratz because it has information not
readily accessible to shareholders. The doctrine can be extended
to cover a new class of beneficiaries: those shareholders who do
not tender some or all of their shares and those whose shares are
taken up pro rata. The purchasing corporation which knows of
its plans for fitting the acquired corporation into its business
(which information is not readily accessible to shareholders)
would have a fiduciary duty to those who sell a portion of their
shares to it. Analogizing from Gratz and Cady, prior to making a
final commitment to retain their assets with the corporation, the
shareholders (at least those who keep some shares) have a right to
rely on the acquiring corporation to act to further their best inter-
ests by disclosing all information material to the shareholder's de-
cision. A fiduciary relationship between remaining subject
company shareholders and the offeror would begin when the offer
is made, since that is when the shareholders need the information
to make a decision. If this argument is accepted, a corporate rela-
tionship based on state common law doctrine would be in exist-
ence at the time of the actual sale of shares. The sale transaction
in a tender offer would then be sufficiently analogous to the proxy
situation to justify state regulation under the internal affairs doc-
trine.
Critics also question the propriety of applying to a corporation
the laws of a state other than the state of incorporation.241 Tradi-
tionally, the state of incorporation is the only one that regulates
240. Id. at 913-14.
241. Sommer, The Ohio TakeoverAct: What Is It 21 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 681, 689
(1970); Note, supra note 217, at 1153.
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the internal affairs of a corporation.242 By basing its jurisdiction
over a corporation on the place of incorporation or principal place
of business and substantial assets, the Idaho takeover statute cre-
ates the possibility that more than one state will control this par-
ticular "internal affair" of corporations. Since the laws of the
state of incorporation control the internal affairs of a corporation
because the corporation is a creation of the laws of that state, it
would be conceptually inconsistent for more than one state to reg-
ulate the internal affairs. Although adhering to the conceptually
consistent theory of internal affairs would no doubt result in less
complicated administration and fewer conflicts of law problems,
such adherence elevates form over substance. Often the certifi-
cate of incorporation is the only contact a state has with its
"home" state. 243 The corporation's promoters choose a state for
incorporation not because it has its principal place of business
there, but because the state corporation laws are more favorable
than those of other states. 2' GWU is an example of this "forum-
shopping." It was incorporated in Delaware but all its other con-
tacts are west of the Mississippi. To insist that a state cannot reg-
ulate tender offers pursuant to an internal affairs theory is to
ignore reality. It is therefore appropriate that there is not abso-
lute prohibition on regulation of internal affairs by another
state.245
This is not to say that there should not be some criteria by
which to restrict the application of the internal affairs doctrine.
Most takeover statutes base jurisdiction over the subject corpora-
tion on a formula which considers its place of incorporation or
principal place of business and/or substantial assets. The Great
Western court read the latter part of the Idaho test disjunctively to
be "principal place of business or substantial assets, ' 246 assuming
the coverage by the statute was greater than it really was. The
Idaho Act, as it should be read "principal place of business and
substantial assets,"247 appears to base jurisdiction on reasonable
242. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 98 (2d ed. 1970).
243. See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959).
244. H. HENN, supra note 242, § 95.
245. See Shipman, supra note 228, at 752, 754-55; f Mansfield Hardwood Lumber
Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959) (laws of
forum apply when only contact with incorporating state is incorporation itself and neither
the corporation's charter nor the statutory laws of the incorporating state apply.).
246. 439 F. Supp. at 436.
247. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(6) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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economic realities.
In what could be considered a corollary to or subcategory
under the internal affairs doctrine, the State of Idaho may have a
third legitimate interest in regulating tender offers to allow corpo-
rate directors to fulfill their fiduciary duties under traditional state
regulation of corporations. Assuming a tender offer can be made
a matter concerning the internal functioning of the corporation,
the task of responding to the offer would fall to the board of direc-
tors. The board is charged with exercising its management duties
in the best interests of the corporation and the shareholders.248 It
may be argued that the board could best fulfill its duties as fiduci-
ary by being given the opportunity to pass on the merits of the
offer and to recommend acceptance or rejection of the offer, along
with providing even more information to the shareholders. 24 9 By
protecting the directors and giving them time and information
before the offer becomes effective to decide the merits of the offer,
the state may simply be permitting the fulfillment of the board's
duty to protect its shareholders.
No matter what theory is accepted, the State of Idaho arguably
possesses a legitimate interest in the regulation of tender offers.
Whether or not the Idaho Act appears to effectuate an interest in
investor protection, it does appear to protect subject company
management and may thereby serve legitimate state interests: pro-
tection of economic welfare and regulation of corporate internal
affairs. For these reasons, it appears that the Idaho interest was
sufficiently legitimate to meet the first prong of the Pike test, de-
spite the court's conclusion to the contrary.
2. Incidental Burden on Interstate Commerce Through
Extraterritorial Effect
Having found that the Idaho Act was not protecting a legiti-
mate local interest, the court summarily asserted that the statute
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.250 In so doing,
the court seems to have made a distinction between "burden" and
"effect" on commerce, discussing "burdens" only when it reached
the balancing portion of the analysis. This distinction, based on a
rigid adherence to the language of the text in Pike, would not ap-
248. See, e.g., Weatherby v. Weatherby Lumber Co., 94 Idaho 504, 506, 492 P.2d 43,
45 (1972); Hanny v. Sunnyside Ditch Co., 82 Idaho 271, 276, 353 P.2d 406, 409 (1960).
249. See Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 882 (1978).
250. 439 F. Supp. at 439.
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pear to be valid since it is necessary to determine whether the ex-
tent of the "burden" is merely incidental before proceeding with
the balancing analysis described in Pike.251
Although the court was correct in its statement that the Idaho
statute prevents a tender offer from going forward until the of-
feror had complied with its provisions, this statement, even with
the later list of burdens added in the third step of the test, is not a
sufficient analysis of the burdens on commerce. To be sufficient
the burdens must be considered in light of the state interests pro-
tected by the statute. 2  The burden which will be tolerated de-
pends upon the nature of the state interest.25 3  Thus, there are
three steps in a complete analysis of burdens on interstate com-
merce. The first step is to ascertain exactly what the burdens are;
second, to compare those burdens with the legitimate state inter-
ests; and third, to determine whether the burdens are merely inci-
dental or per se illegal.
The Act prohibits the making of a cash tender offer anywhere
unless it is made as well to all shareholders in Idaho. 4  In so
doing, the Act prevents the interstate movement of three things:
the offer itself, the securities for which the offer is made, and the
control of the corporation. Similar provisions255 have been criti-
cized as granting the state extraterritorial regulatory powers.256
The court adopted this criticism, stating: "The Idaho Statute thus
undertakes to regulate the offeror's affairs not only within Idaho,
but within all states in which the offeror might make a tender of-
fer., 257
Concededly, the Act has the potential to frustrate or destroy
tender offers once made and discourage others from being made.
Its provisions impede the very elements which make a tender offer
251. The Pike test states: "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits." 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (emphasis added). See text ac-
companying notes 192-209 supra.
252. Pike goes on to explain that the tolerable burden "will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities." 397 U.S. at 142.
253. Id.
254. IDAHO CODE § 30-1506(I) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
255. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(C) (Page Supp. 1976).
256. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORArE CONTROL 172
(1973); Sommer, supra note 241, at 714.
257. 439 F. Supp. at 439.
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successful: secrecy and speed.258  Even several proponents of
takeover statutes have acknowledged the potential adverse effects
upon tender offers.2 9
While these predictions may be realistic, it is difficult to prove
that the Idaho Act would in fact discourage or frustrate a tender
offer. The GWU offer did not proceed far enough to test the
Act's effects; nor did the court present evidence to back its opinion
as to the "tendency" of takeover statutes. The absence of proof
concerning the Idaho Act opens the door for evidence of other
states' experience. In an amicus brief filed with the Fifth Circuit,
the State of Ohio argued against the court's assumption; the Ohio
brief contended that in the eight years since the Ohio Takeover
Act was enacted, it "has not prevented a single corporate tender
offer." 260  Ohio's conclusions as to its own statute, while perhaps
probative, cannot be applied universally to assume 6psofacto that
no state takeover statute delays or prevents tender offers. Only
ten takeover bids have been administered under the Ohio Act in
its eight year history.2 6 Between 1970 and 1976 there were
nearly 300 tender offers made in the United States.262 Without
further statistical evidence testing the effect of takeover statutes on
tender offers, it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the Ohio
experience. Since the court presented no evidence to support its
conclusion and the Ohio information is insufficient, it is difficult
to accept conclusively the position of either the court or of the
State of Ohio.
Should the amicus brief be correct in assuming that state stat-
utes generally do not cause tender offers to fail, the Idaho Act
may nonetheless impose a burden on the interstate tender offer.
The delay inherent in administration under the Idaho Act may
cause an increase in the price, forcing the offeror to pay more for
subject company shares than it would otherwise have been re-
258. See text accompanying notes 165-71 supra.
259. Referring to the Ohio Act, Arthur Vorys stated, "I suspect, so far as Ohio and
Ohio-based corporations are concerned, the corporate takeover as a form of corporate war-
fare is a thing of the past." Vorys, Ohio Tender Offers Bill, 43 OHIo B. 65, 70 (1970).
Morgan Shipman, as well, believed that "[t]he takeover movement is now largely mori-
bund because ... [of] the state laws governing takeover bids... !' Shipman, supra note
228, at 722-23.
260. Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of Ohio at 19, Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept.
16, 1977).
261. Id. at 6.
262. Appleton, The Proposed SEC Tender Offer Rules-The Proposed Requirements,
32 Bus. LAW. 1381, 1381 (1977).
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quired to pay. Additional information required in Idaho may
also place a burden on the offeror to update and include with
tender offer filings information found in its SEC record of Form
10-K and Form 8-K reports.26 3  Finally, the Idaho Act together
with other takeover statutes might impose a burden on the offer
by forcing the acquiring corporation to comply with multiple or
conflicting statutes. In Great Western, GWU faced the potential
of having to comply with three takeover acts: Idaho, New York,
and Maryland. Although the Great Western court refused to as-
sert jurisdiction over the challenge to the statutes of the latter two
states, all three states had claimed jurisdiction over the offer based
upon Sunshine assets found within their borders.2 4 To the extent
that states claiming jurisdiction over an offer differ in their re-
quirements, 265 the offeror faces the added burden of meeting the
aggregate of all requirements imposed by those statutes. Regard-
less of the content of other statutes, the simple fact of forcing the
offeror to file in two or more states imposes a burden on the of-
feror, at least to the extent of the additional time spent in prepar-
ing and filing pursuant to multiple state statutes.
To the extent that the Act either destroys or impedes the mak-
ing of a successful interstate tender offer, it burdens interstate
commerce. By raising barriers to the offer itself, the Idaho Act
also impedes the traffic in securities and corporate control, both of
which depend upon the unfettered functioning of the offer.
Implementation of the Act, however, might still further burden
interstate commerce, irrespective of its actual impact on the offer
itself. Through its preoffer notification and hearing provisions,
the Idaho statute potentially disrupts the market for subject com-
pany shares. The court noted the possible disruption, reasoning
that "there would be little market for the stock while the waiting
periods were complied with. 26 6 In a statement by the New York
Stock Exchange arguing against the Ohio Takeover Act, the Ex-
change considered in more detail the effects of preoffer notifica-
tion and delay:
While this [advance notice requirement] would provide an ex-
tended period during which the Division could review the offer
263. See text accompanying notes 161-63 supra.
264. 429 F. Supp. at 427-28.
265. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1) (Page Supp. 1977). The Ohio
Act imposes an automatic 20-day waiting period before any action is taken. Idaho has no
automatic 20-day delay, but provides an option for a minimum 20-day delay pending a
hearing. IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) & (5) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
266. 439 F. Supp. at 439.
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and entertain protests by the target company management, it
would also create difficult conditions in the market for the tar-
get company's stock. . . [T]here could be rumors, counter-of-
fers and rumors of counter-offers which may result in price
fluctuations to the extent that the market in the stock would be
disrupted. This may make it necessary for the Exchange to
temporarily halt trading in the stock. In some cases trading
may be halted for the duration of the. . . period. The impact
of the. . . law would thereby be felt by investors throughout
the Nation who would be deprived of a market for the securi-
ties they hold in the. . . company. 267
Market disruption is likely to occur during the postoffer wait-
ing period because there is no uncertainty about the viability of
the offer. Where the frustration of tender offers acts to impede
existing subject company shareholders from trading their securi-
ties outside the normal channels of trade, the potential effects of
state-imposed delay upon the market would prevent those wishing
to become subject company shareholders from gaining access to
those channels during the period of review. As a result, a burden
of some sort appears to cover all aspects of an interstate tender
offer: the offer, the shift in corporate control, and the trading of
securities.
But merely because a statute has a more than local effect and
creates a burden on commerce does not mean ipsofacto that it is
an illegal or unconstitutional burden. A burden may be illegal in
three ways. First, it may be per se illegal because the state statute
discriminates against interstate commerce in favor of local busi-
ness.2 68 Those statutes which impose a heavier obligation on out-
of-state transactions or out-of-state parties doing business in-state
will be imposing per se illegal burdens on commerce.269 So also
will those state laws which require business to be done in-state.27°
Second, where a state regulates in an area where there are
likely to be conflicting and/or multiple state laws, it will have to
267. Statement by the New York Stock Exchange on Amend. Sub. S.B. No. 138, File
No. 90 (Reg. Sess. 1969-1970) (May 9, 1969), quoted in Sommer, supra note 241, at 700;
accord, [1969] 1 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-11 to A-12.
268. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
269. Id.
270. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970); see, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948); Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928). In Toomer, the Court paid
close attention to the cost burden placed on the company, saying: "There was also uncon-
tradicted evidence that appellants' costs would be materially increased by the necessity of
having their shrimp unloaded and packed in South Carolina ports rather than at their
home bases in Georgia where they maintain their own docking, warehousing, refrigeration
and packing facilities." Id. at 403.
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make a detailed and persuasive showing that its interest offset the
burdens on commerce in order for the burden to be sustained.271
Finally, if there is not a danger of multiple inconsistent burdens, a
burden may be illegal if the benefits under the statute do not
counterbalance the burdens on commerce.
272
As stated above, the burden which will be tolerated depends
upon the nature of the state interest protected by the statute. In
the case of the Idaho Act, the degree of the burden may vary de-
pending upon which theory of legitimate state interest is used. If
the legitimacy of Idaho's tender offer regulation hinges on the
state's right to regulate the internal affairs of its corporations, then
any extraterritorial effects could be viewed as being on the same
level as those which result from the state's traditional regulation Of
corporate internal affairs. The fact that the regulation affects
subject company shareholders beyond the state borders would not
necessarily be an improper application of the statute, but rather
the result of internal regulation. However, the difficulty in argu-
ing the legitimacy of the regulation under an internal affairs the-
ory lessens the likelihood that the Act would escape invalidation
as an unconstitutional overreach in derogation of the commerce
clause.
On the other hand, if the legitimacy of Idaho's tender offer
regulation rests on the protection of local economic interests or on
shareholder protection, then the burdens on interstate commerce
may be more difficult to justify. First, protecting local economic
interests would appear to be a relatively weak state interest be-
cause the Supreme Court appears to treat those interests less fa-
vorably than state interests in the protection of local health and
safety.273 Second, the state's interest in shareholder protection is
rather small where only eleven resident shareholders are required
to trigger the statute.27
4
Balanced against this, the Act imposes multiple burdens-the
interference with the interstate movement of the offer, the securi-
ties, and corporate control; the inconvenience of multiple filings
for the offeror; and the potential for market disruption.
271. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959).
272. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
273. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531
(1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523-24 (1935).
274. IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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The Great Western court addressed the multiple burdens issue
in conclusory fashion: "[Compliance. . .with one state statute
interferes with commerce; compliance with many state statutes (as
in a tender for a large company) would unquestionably have a
deleterious effect on interstate commerce." 75 The next two sec-
tions suggest the analysis that would be more appropriate in de-
ciding the commerce clause issue.
3. Multiple Burdens
As previously stated, if a statute regulates in an area where
there exists the potential for multiple and conflicting statutes, then
the state must show that the interest protected is sufficiently im-
portant to justify the regulation. The first question to be an-
swered is whether there are in fact multiple conflicting state
statutes in the area 6f tender offer regulation. The answer de-
pends upon the extent of jurisdiction asserted by the statutes.
There are thirty-three state takeover statutes.2 76 Some apply
where the subject corporation is incorporated in the state or has its
principal place of business and substantial assets in the state.277
Others apply when the subject company is incorporated in the
state, or has its principal place of business or has substantial assets
in the state. 8  If all statutes were of the latter type, more states
would have jurisdiction over tender offers, particularly those for
the larger corporations, and there would be a greater likelihood of
conflict among state statutes. But not all takeover statutes assert
such broad jurisdiction; in such cases, only tender offers for the
largest corporations are likely to involve more than two state stat-
utes.
Even though the statutes governing a given takeover are few in
number, there are many possibilities for conflict. The waiting pe-
riods vary, 79 as do disclosure and hearing requirements.8 0
275. 439 F. Supp. at 439.
276. See note 64 supra.
277. Eg., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976); OHIO REy. CODE
ANN. § 1707.041(A)(1) (Page Supp. 1977).
278. E.g., IND. CODE § 23 (Supp. 1975); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS. CODE ANN. § 11-901(i)
(Supp. 1976).
279. For instance, the Ohio Takeover Act, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1)
(Page Supp. 1977), has an automatic 20-day waiting period and the Idaho Act, IDAHO
CODE § 30-1503(4) (Cum. Supp. 1975) has no specified waiting period beyond that neces-
sary to obtain the director's approval.
280. Under the Idaho Act, IDAHO CODE § 30-1503(4) (Cum. Supp. 1975), subject com-
pany management may order that a hearing be held, while under the Ohio Act, OHIo REv.
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Standards of approval for the offer itself also differ.28' The op-
portunities for delay in one state could spell defeat for a tender
offer made to shareholders in other states whose statutes have dif-
ferent provisions. It has been suggested that these burdens will
disappear when states coordinate their efforts and when conflicts
of law principles are applied.282 State coordination is not guaran-
teed and conflicts of law principles will not preliminarily restrict
the number of state statutes with which an offeror must comply.
It would seem that even with few states actually regulating a
tender offer, the multiple burdens on interstate commerce would
require the state to show that it is protecting a substantial state
interest. The state would have to demonstrate that either its inter-
est in investor protection, internal affairs regulation, or protection
of local economic well-being is important enough to justify multi-
ple burdens on interstate commerce. This would be a difficult
task. Since there are already federal laws that protect investors,
those three state interests would arguably not be sufficient. It is
also doubtful that Idaho will be able to show that tender offers
present a real economic threat in terms of loss of jobs or removal
of the business from the state.283 The state's interest in internal
affairs presents the strongest state interest because the tender offer
will result in a change of corporate control, which has tradition-
ally been a matter of state control. The tender offer method of
acquiring control avoids state regulation because it is not a shift
which originates from within the corporation. It may be elevating
form over substance to have the place of origin of the change gov-
ern the application and constitutionality of state law. A problem
may arise, though, when a state other than the state of incorpora-
tion asserts jurisdiction. The other state may have difficulty
CODE ANN. § 1707.041(B)(1)(B) (Page Supp. 1977), subject company management may
request a hearing, but the commissioner may deny the request if he finds it unnecessary.
281. For instance, registration may be denied under the Minnesota Act, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 803.03 (subd. 5) (West. Cum. Supp. 1977), if the takeover bid (1) fails to provide for
full and fair disclosure of all material information, (2) is unfair and inequitable to share-
holders, (3) is not made to all shareholders on equal terms, and (4) is in violation of the
Blue Sky Law. Other statutes require somewhat less. The Idaho Act, IDAHO CODE
§§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Cum. Supp. 1975), contains no provision requiring the offer to be
found "unfair and inequitable." The Pennsylvania Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74 (Pur-
don Supp. 1978), includes all standards but that forbidding the offer to be made on other
than equal terms.
282. Amicus Brief of the State of Ohio at 23, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F.
Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977).
283. Cf id. at 8 (The Ohio Attorney General argues that the offeror, rather than wish-
ing to remove management following a takeover, seeks to maintain existing management.).
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proving a need for its additional regulation where the incorpora-
tion state already regulates or has chosen not to regulate. This
makes the state's interest in internal affairs regulation a weaker
interest, perhaps too weak to tip the balance against the multiple
burdens.
4. Balancing
To proceed to the balancing analysis, it must be assumed that
the effect on interstate commerce is merely incidental to the pro-
tection of state interests. When the state's interest rests on the
regulation of the internal affairs of a corporation, it would be rea-
sonable to conclude that the effect on commerce is incidental.
The third criterion of Pike balances these incidental burdens
against the benefits, focusing solely upon that benefit to share-
holders which might accrue from the Idaho Act's implementa-
tion.28 4 It found the sole benefit to shareholders to be an increase
in the value of their stock during the waiting period.285 As the
stock's price rises on the market, the acquiring corporation must
also raise its offering price to maintain sufficient incentive for
shareholders to tender.
After weighing this minimal benefit against the state statute's
tendency to discourage tender offers, the court found that the bal-
ance was tipped against the validity of the statute.286 The court's
analysis may be somewhat incomplete. Given the general pre-
sumption in favor of constitutionality, the court should have
raised every possible benefit and should have evaluated the extent
of those benefits. The totality of benefits could then have been
weighed against any burden on interstate commerce.
The court was correct in weighing the benefits to the share-
holders, but it stopped short of considering all possible share-
holder benefits. There may also be a shareholder benefit in the
increased disclosure required under the Idaho Act. However, it is
doubtful that shareholders would derive any actual benefit from
the greater disclosure, since the amount or kind of information is
not substantially different from the information required under
section 14(d) of the 1934 Act. 7
The benefit gained from a price rise can be challenged in the
same way. The federal requirement that any increase in offering
284. 439 F. Supp. at 439.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See text accompanying notes 149-60 supra.
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price must be paid retroactively to all shareholders who have al-
ready tendered 288 assures equal benefits to all shareholders in the
same manner as the Idaho Act requires. Furthermore, if the wait-
ing period results in the offer failing or being withdrawn, either
through the market price increasing to a level prohibitive for
tender offers or the subject company management being given
time to defend successfully against the offer, not only will the
shareholder not receive the benefit of an increased price, but he
will also lose any benefit of profit on his investment.289 Thus,
whatever benefit could be derived from the Act by virtue of the
state's express interest in shareholder protection appears all but
neutralized in light of other circumstances.
Since the court did not recognize the protection of local busi-
nesses and jobs to be a legitimate state interest, it would not have
considered any benefits flowing from such regulations. To the
extent the Act prevents the liquidation or removal of corporations
from the state, it would benefit the citizens and the state in general
by preserving employment opportunities and tax revenues for the
State of Idaho. By providing protection for subject corporations,
the Idaho Act might succeed in drawing threatened corporations
to Idaho, thus possibly creating greater revenue and employment
for the state. However, this state benefit also pales when coun-
tered by a lack of evidence that acquiring corporations generally
liquidate or transfer subject companies.29° Without such proof it
is equally likely for acquiring corporations to allow the subject
company to continue as before, changing only management to op-
erate more efficiently. The loss of a few positions would not be a
sufficient economic loss to warrant the burden on interstate com-
merce. The benefit also weakens when viewed in light of the con-
gressional purpose of maintaining tender offers-to allow efficient
companies to take over the less efficient. Thus, Idaho's economy
could benefit from a more efficient use of both human and natural
resources.
288. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1978).
289. Of course, the shareholder might still be able to sell his stock on the open market
before the offer failed and take advantage of the increased price. If the New York Stock
Exchange halted trading in the subject company stock, however, this avenue would close as
well. See note 174 supra.
290. Cf. Amicus Brief of the State of Ohio at 8, Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439
F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), appeal docketed No. 77-2809 (5th Cir. Sept. 16, 1977) (The
Ohio Attorney General argues that the acquiring corporations desire to maintain existing
management, implying that they would not liquidate the subject company).
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One last possible benefit may be gleaned from the state's inter-
est in regulating tender offers as part of the general regulation of
corporate internal affairs. That benefit arises from the protection
afforded shareholders as a result of the fiduciary duty imposed on
subject company managers to operate in the shareholders' best in-
terest. This theory requires offerors, pursuant to the doctrine of
anticipatory fiduciary duty, to act in the best interests of subject
company shareholders.29' It also gives subject company directors
more time and information with which to exercise their fiduciary
duties to evaluate the offer for the benefit of their shareholders.
Any benefit that may result from subject company management
having more time and information with which to evaluate the of-
fer may be counteracted by the conflict of interest aspects of the
decision. Directors and management must make a decision
which could well affect their positions, and state law may not af-
ford adequate remedies for defects in these types of decisions.
Similarly, any benefit which accrues from imposing a fiduciary
duty on the offerors with respect to the offerees is contingent upon
a court extending the anticipatory fiduciary duty doctrine to cover
the tender offer situation, an extension that may be reasonable
and appro3riate, but by no means certain at this time.
The putative benefits to be derived from the Idaho Act are
contingent and thereby, weak. The benefits of a price rise may be
neutralized by the threat that the offer might fail; that protection
or enhancement of economic welfare hinges on the propensity for
acquirers to loot or liquidate subject companies; and that ex-
tending to the offeror the obligation under general corporation
law to act as a fiduciary is contingent upon the applicability of the
internal affairs and anticipatory fiduciary duty doctrines. These
are the benefits to be weighed against the burdens discussed in the
preceding section, ie., interfering with the interstate passage of
the offer itself, the securities for which the offer is made, and the
control of the corporation for which the securities are sought.292
Where the Idaho Act does not apply, as in the case of uncontested
tender offers, any burden imposed by the state on the free flow of
these intangibles is at a minimum.2 9 3 Where the Act does apply,
however, it may be considered as burdening interstate commerce
291. See notes 233-40 supra and accompanying text.
292. The commerce clause protects the interstate traffic of intangibles to the same ex-
tent as it protects tangible items. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 258-59 (1946).
293. Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 23 (1976).
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by impeding or frustrating the tender offer and disrupting the
trading of securities in the national market. Given benefits that
are so contingent, if not ephemeral, they would not seem to pro-
vide a sufficient counterweight to the burdens imposed. Even
when one assumes that the basis for state regulation of tender of-
fers is the governance of internal corporate affairs, the burdens
would seem to outweigh the benefits. Where the state's purpose
is to protect shareholders or economic well-being, the scales tip
more heavily to the burden side. Thus, applying the balancing
test of Pike, the burdens are greater than the benefits and would
be an impermissible interference with interstate commerce.
Indeed, there are positive benefits of tender offers that further
support this conclusion. From the legislative history of the Wil-
liams Act it is clear that Congress meant to preserve the flow of
tender offers in interstate commerce 294 at the same time it sought
to protect shareholders. Congress may have recognized the bene-
fits-in terms of bringing more efficient management to the sub-
ject company--obtainable by shifting control from the subject
company management to the acquiring corporation. Permitting a
shift in control through the tender offer benefits the subject com-
pany shareholders as a result of more efficient management pro-
ducing greater wealth maximization.295
A thorough commerce clause analysis reveals that although le-
gitimate local interests are protected by the Idaho statute, the stat-
ute does burden interstate commerce, and those burdens are not
constitutionally permissible, either because of the existence of
multiple, conflicting burdens or because the interference with in-
terstate commerce outweighs the contingent and speculative bene-
fits to the state. Once again, as with the preemption issue, the
court's conclusion appears to be correct, but in reaching that con-
clusion, the court did not employ the correct analysis.
III. Great Western AND TENDER OFFER LEGISLATION
The constitutionality of tender offer legislation is an issue that
demands more than the cursory analysis undertaken in Great
Western. A significant cause of the difficulty in reconciling state
and federal regulation may stem from the differing policy con-
cerns adopted on each level. Tender offers reflect aspects both of
294. See H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1967), reprinted in [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813.
295. Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REv. 377, 386 n.59 (1969).
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investment and disinvestment. In other words, a tender offer may
appeal to those shareholders wishing to remain with the subject
company and derive economic benefit from more efficient man-
agement of their investment after the takeover; it also may appeal
to shareholders desiring liquidity and a quick profit. It may be
argued that federal law and state law favor different interests in
regulating tender offers. By preserving the secrecy and speed
necessary for a successful tender offer, federal regulation may ap-
pear to favor those who want liquidity since the subject company
is given little time to defend against the offer. State law, on the
other hand, appears more favorable to those wanting to retain
their investment, as seen by the emphasis placed on disclosing the
corporate history of the offeror and by the opportunity given to
the director to evaluate the benefits of the offer.
Even assuming that federal and state regulations favor differ-
ent interests is not to say that federal regulation protects profit-
seekers to the complete exclusion of those interested in invest-
ment. If tender offers effectuate the removal of entrenched, inef-
ficient management, then the interests of those shareholders
seeking wealth-maximization through their investment would re-
ceive equal benefits under federal legislation. It does not appear
that state law accommodates these differing shareholder interests
effectively. Although the offeror might raise the offering price to
match the market rise during preoffer delay, any extra profit real-
ized by the tendering shareholder could be obtained by the federal
provision requiring price increases to be paid to all tendered
shares. Moreover, to the extent that state law is more likely to
permit inefficient management to defend successfully against an
offer, it does not promote the interests of shareholders remaining
with the company as well as federal legislation. If federal legisla-
tion can successfully accommodate both interests and do it more
effectively than state law, then in terms of meeting the policy con-
cerns, state legislation has no purpose.
Express congressional preemption or consent presents the most
conclusive method of dealing with this dichotomous situation, at
least in terms of settling the preemption issue. However, Con-
gress is not likely to address the issue without strengthening the
federal provisions.296 In the absence of any congressional initia-
tive, the future of state takeover laws is thus left to the courts; or,
296. Sommer, Commentar--Takeover Statutes, 32 Bus. LAW. 1483, 1486 (1977).
Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, which oversees securities legislation, is strongly opposed to tender offers
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rather, it is left to other courts to build upon or disregard what
Great Western has begun. Great Western is not, perhaps, the best
possible case to test the validity of takeover statutes. At the in-
ception of the case, the Idaho Takeover Act had yet to be tested
administratively. No history of application of the Idaho Act to
prior tender offers existed to give the court a firm base for its deci-
sion. In addition, the court revealed little more than a framework
for further analysis. Yet, its ultimate conclusion of constitutional
invalidity appears sound.
Certainly, the issue of constitutionality of all takeover statutes
will not be laid to rest by this one district court opinion. On the
issue of preemption, the court discounted "pervasiveness" and
"dominance" arguments that would have invalidated all stat-
utes.297 Instead, it based preemption on a conflict in purposes
that turns solely upon the construction given the Idaho Act's pro-
visions as measured against the objectives of the Williams Act.
Under this theory, each state statute must be litigated separately.
Given the distinctions among provisions in state statutes, it is un-
certain what effect Great Western would have even as an analogy
for preemption. With regard to the commerce clause issue as
well, the district court's opinion was limited solely to the burden
of the Idaho Act upon interstate commerce. The decision there-
fore does not invalidate state takeover statutes as a class. 298 The
narrow analysis of the court leaves the door open for other courts
to test independently the validity of other state statutes.
Great Western should not be dismissed as moot on appeal.
With the necessity for speed in a tender offer, it is unlikely any
offeror hopeful for success could withhold completing the acquisi-
tion until litigation ended. Thus, an appellate court could invoke
mootness as an avoidance technique.299 Yet suits over similar
takeover acts are likely to arise after Great Western, and the issue
of constitutionality under the commerce and supremacy clauses
cries out for review. Tender offers now face dual regulation in
over half the states. 3" It was argued in 1970 that state takeover
and would probably object to any effort to preempt legislatively as the federal provisions
now stand. Id.
297. See text following note 132 supra.
298. See 439 F. Supp. at 440.
299. E.g., Moore v. Ogilive, 394 U.S. 814 (1969); see Sosna v. Iowa, 414 U.S. 393
(1975). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, P. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 110-14 & 1977 Supple-
ment 13-23 (2d ed. 1972 & 1977 Supp.).
300. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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statutes should be given a trial as an "interesting and useful exper-
iment in state securities and corporate law legislation. '3 1 Never-
theless, as Justice Brandeis stated in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann,3 °2 experimentation is permissible only so long as it is
"without risk to the rest of the country." 30 3  Given the massive
proliferation of takeover acts in recent years, perhaps it is time to
test and reach a resolution on the "useful experiment. ' '304
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the importance of the issues to the regulation of securi-
ties nationwide, an appeal to the Supreme Court is almost as-
sured. Assuming the case is not dismissed for mootness or for
lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court has three options: affirm,
reverse, or interpet the statute restrictively so as to avoid the con-
stitutional questions. It is possible for the Court to attempt to
impute a sufficiently narrow construction to the Idaho Act to find
it constitutional. The vehicle may be section 30-1506(l), which
heretofore has been deemed to confer an extraterritorial overreach
on the Act in derogation of the commerce clause. The provision
states that "[n]o offeror may make a takeover offer involving a
target company which is not made to all its stockholders in this
state, or which is not made to stockholders in this state on substan-
tially the same terms as the offer is made to stockholders outside
this state. ' 30  By emphasizing the word "all," one might read the
first clause as merely forbidding the offeror, once the offer is
made in Idaho, from extending it to less than all the stockholders
residing within the state borders. Although such an interpreta-
tion stretches the literal language, it has the benefit of sidestepping
the constitutional danger of extraterritoriality and brings the Act
more in line with the purpose of blue sky laws to protect state
citizens. While this alternative construction might avoid invali-
301. Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio
TakeoverAct, 21 CASE W. REs. L. Rv. 722, 760 (1970).
302. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
303. Id. at 311. See 1 L. Loss, SEcURTrEs REGULATION 104-05 (2d ed. 1961), in
which the author states, "[Tihe price of the experimentation . . . should not be too
high .... Whatever . . . protection [separate legislation may] afford should not be
achieved at any unnecessary cost to legitimate business."
304. Should the court not dismiss the case for mootness, it still might not meet the
merits if it overturns the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. As noted at the outset, this
jurisdictional issue in Great Western creates as much or more controversy as the merits.
See note 15 supra.
305. IDAHO CODE § 30-1506() (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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dation under the commerce clause, it is questionable what effect it
would have on the preemption issue. Arguably, the abrogation of
one provision does not lessen the potential conflict between fed-
eral and state regulation. The Act would continue to delay the
offer and exempt both subject company management from disclo-
sure and consented offers from regulation in conflict with the Wil-
liams Act.
If the Supreme Court overturns the decisions of the appellate
court, two-tier regulation will become virtually universal. Even if
the decision is limited to upholding the Idaho Act alone, attacks
on other state statutes would hold little hope for success since the
Idaho Act ranks among the most stringent takeover statues. On
the other hand, if the lower court's ruling is upheld, state takeover
acts would have a limited future.
It should be recognized, however, that invalidation by the
courts of one or of all state takeover statutes cannot remove all
possibility of a viable form of state regulation of tender offers.
Congress holds the option of expressly consenting to state regula-
tion."°6 Furthermore, absent a judicial determination of preemp-
tion on "pervasiveness" or "dominance" grounds, states such as
Idaho might amend their statutes to remove those excesses that
conflict with the Williams Act and unduly burden interstate com-
merce. The Idaho Act, unlike statutes of states such as Ohio and
Virginia, contains no severability clause by which a statute may
still stand although portions are declared unconstitutional. Thus,
Idaho faces the task of rebuilding its takeover statute. To bring
the Act more in harmony with federal regulation and the com-
merce clause, the following amendments are suggested.30 7
First, state disclosure requirements should be extended to
cover subject company management. Rule 14(d) of the Williams
Act requires minimum disclosure whenever management makes a
recommendation.0 8 If the articulated purpose is to provide full
disclosure to investors, disclosure by management would seem as
important as disclosure by the offeror.
Second, the exemption for noncontested offers should be re-
moved. The need of shareholders for full disclosure upon which
to base their decision does not vary with the approval of subject
company management.
306. See text accompanying notes 193-96 supra.
307. A major proponent of the Ohio Takeover Act suggested amendments to that
state's statute similar to those offered here. Shipman, supra note 301, at 762-69.
308. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1976).
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Third, the state should discard preoffer approval and hearing
provisions. If the proper purpose is to allow sufficient time for
investors to pass on the acceptability of the offer, a postoffer pe-
riod-such as the fifteen day period in federal regulations-
should adequately protect shareholders. As a result, the state
avoids delaying and frustrating tender offers and disrupting the
market. This would be a means of protecting shareholders that is
less burdensome on interstate commerce. At the very least the
state ought to remove the power of subject company management
to require a hearing without cause. Instead of the director pass-
ing on the acceptability of the offer, the state might consider pro-
viding for injunctive relief to permit adjudication of questionable
offers.
The state might also consider redefining section 30-1506(1)
along the lines indicated above to remove allusions to extraterrito-
rial application of the Act and alleviate some of the burden on
interstate commerce. In this fashion, the legitimate state interests
involved in tender offers could be vindicated through a system of
regulation that is both two-tiered and consistent with the Consti-
tution.
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